STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES
FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS:
Recommendations from a Community of Practice
U.S Department of Justice
Ofce of Community Oriented Policing Services
is project was supported by Cooperative Agreement
Number 2003-HS-WX-K040 awarded by the Oce
of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S.
Department of Justice. Opinions contained in
this document are those of the authors and do not
necessarily represent the ocial position or policies of
the U.S. Department of Justice. References to specic
agencies, companies, products, or services should not
be considered an endorsement by the authors or the
U.S. Department of Justice. Rather, the references are
illustrations to supplement discussion of the issues.
is document is the result of collaboration among
several large law enforcement agencies. References to
the Internal Aairs methods or approaches of specic
agencies are included in the document as illustrative
examples only and should not be considered an
endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the U.S.
Department of Justice.
For further information concerning this report, contact:
Los Angeles Police Department
Commanding Ocer, Professional Standards Bureau
304 South Broadway, Suite 200
Los Angeles, CA 90013
213.473.6672
4
Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
Contents
Letter from the Director 6
Acknowledgments 7
Introduction 11
1.0 Intake 13
1.1 What a complaint is and who may le one
14
1.2 How a complaint can be transmitted and what
forms it can take
14
1.3 Receiving complaints at agency facilities
15
1.4 Availability of complaint forms or other means of
ling complaints
16
1.5 Dissuading complainants
17
1.6 Tracking complaints
17
1.7 Complaint acknowledgments
18
1.8 Auditing complaint intake
18
1.9 Complaints and lawsuits
19
2.0 Classication of Complaints 21
2.1 Criminal complaints
22
2.2 When criminal prosecution is declined
23
2.3 Internal administrative complaints
23
2.4 Holding administrative complaints
in abeyance during criminal proceedings
24
3.0 Investigation 27
3.1 “Complete investigation” dened
29
3.2 Frequent or chronic complainants
30
3.3 Special needs of criminal investigations
30
3.4 Cases Internal Aairs should investigate
31
3.5 Cases Internal aairs should relegate
32
3.6 Recommendations for time limits
33
3.7 e use of administrative leave
34
3.8 Electronic recordings of interviews
34
3.9 Standards of investigative report quality
36
3.10 e use of a chronology
37
3.11 Agencies should consider using Compliance
Audits
38
3.12 Response to, and review of, lethal-force
investigations
40
3.13 Lethal-force investigations: interviews and
evidence
42
3.14 Investigations during lawsuits
45
3.15 Post-resignation investigations
46
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Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
Appendix: A Sampling of
Major City Police Force
Discipline Policies 61
Atlanta Police Department
62
Boston Police Department
63
Chicago Police Department
64
Dallas Police Department
65
Detroit Police Department
66
Houston Police Department
67
Los Angeles Police Department
68
Los Angeles County Sheri’s
Department
71
Metropolitan Police Department
(Washington, D.C.)
72
Miami-Dade Police Department
73
Philadelphia Police Department
75
Phoenix Police Department
76
4.0 Mediation, Adjudication,
and Disposition 49
4.1 e four basic resolution categories
50
4.2 e value of considering commanding ocers’
options
51
4.3 Proposed reporting relationship of the head of
Internal Aairs
51
4.4 Standards for adjudication
52
4.5 Penalty assessment and the use of a penalty
matrix
53
4.6 e advantages of mediation and the conditions of
its use
54
4.7 Settlement agreements and their value
55
4.8 Exploring alternatives to traditional
discipline
56
4.9 Keeping investigations condential
59
4.10 Guidelines for selecting and retaining Internal
Aairs investigators
59
6
Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
Letter from the Director
Since 1996, and as part of our mission, the Oce of Community
Oriented Policing Services (the COPS Oce) has been supporting law
enforcement agencies in a variety of initiatives and programs to create
or strengthen local programs that help agencies build trust with the
communities they are sworn to serve and protect. e COPS Oce seeks
to create the community policing environments that develop or improve
that trust and mutual respect and ensure equal treatment for all citizens.
Mutual trust and respect are at the heart of eective policing and the
overwhelming majority of our nation’s law enforcement ocers are
principled men and women who provide professional services to the
communities they serve with honor and distinction. e responsibilities
they shoulder are great, and agency and public expectations are high.
Unfortunately, on the rare occasion when an ocer is accused of
misconduct or criminal activity, he or she may be subject to an
investigation. Implementing an honest and fair fact-nding process that
uncovers the truth is the important role of the internal aairs function
of a law enforcement agency, and it is essential to maintain a process that
protects the rights of all involved, including the accused ocer.
is report, Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs:
Recommendations from a Community of Practice, was developed by the
National Internal Aairs Community of Practice group, a collaborative
partnership of the Los Angeles (California) Police Department and 11
other major city and county law enforcement agencies. e agencies
shared and developed standards and best practices in internal aairs
work, discussed dierences and similarities in practice, and looked at
various approaches to improving their individual and collective agencies’
internal aairs practices.
e COPS Oce understands the importance of learning from the
experience of others. It is in this spirit that we are pleased to provide this
report to you. We hope you will nd this publication helpful in your local
eorts, and we encourage you to share this publication, as well as your
successes, with other law enforcement practitioners.
Sincerely,
Carl Peed
Former Director
e COPS Oce
7
Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
Acknowledgments
is nal report was produced by the following project team, whose
members are solely responsible for its contents:
Project Team Leader:
Deputy Chief Mark R. Perez, Los Angeles Police Department
Project Team:
Major Cerelyn Davis, Atlanta Police Department
Lieutenant Detective Robert Harrington, Boston Police Department
Assistant Deputy Superintendent Debra Kirby, Chicago Police
Department
Deputy Chief omas Ward, Dallas Police Department
Commander Brian Stair, Detroit Police Department
Assistant Chief Michael Dirden, Houston Police Department
Captain Karyn Mannis, Los Angeles County Sheri’s Depatment
Major Donald Rifkin, Miami-Dade Police Department
Deputy Chief Bruce Adams, New Orleans Police Department
Inspector Robert Small, Philadelphia Police Department
Commander George Richards, Phoenix Police Department
Inspector Matthew Klein, Metropolitan Police Department
(Washington, D.C.)
Special thanks to:
Chief Michael Berkow, Savannah-Chatham Metropolitan Police
Department, who originated the project while working for the Los
Angeles Police Department as Deputy Chief.
Senior Policy Analyst Albert A. Pearsall III, U.S. Department of Justice
Oce of Community Oriented Policing Services, who continually oered
guidance and assistance at every stage.
Judith E. Beres, a contractor with the U.S. Department of Justice Oce
of Community Oriented Policing Services, for her nal editing of this
document.
Senior Policy Advisor Steven Edwards, U.S. Department of Justice
Bureau of Justice Assistance, who likewise was vital to the project.
8
Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
Nationally recognized expert advisors provided valuable insights from the
realms of civilian oversight, academic research, and consultancy:
Merrick Bobb, President, Police Assessment Resource Center
Michael Gennaco, Chief Attorney, Los Angeles County Oce of
Independent Review
Andre Birotte, Inspector General, City of Los Angeles Board of Police
Commissioners
Sam Pailca, Seattle Police Department Oce of Professional
Accountability
Joshua Ederheimer, Police Executive Research Forum
Dennis Nowicki, Police Consultant
Dr. Georey Alpert, University of South Carolina
Robert H. Aaronson, Aaronson Law Oces
Particularly in the early and middle stages of the project, many contributed
to the discourse and ideas:
Commander Jerey Noble, Irvine Police Department
Commander James F. Voge, Los Angeles Police Department
Chief William McSweeney, Los Angeles County Sheri’s Department
Deputy Chief Michael Ault, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
Major Welcome Harris, Atlanta Police Department
Lieutenant Melvin Hendricks, Atlanta Police Department
Superintendent Albert Goslin, Boston Police Department
Lieutenant Frank Mancini, Boston Police Department
Cameron Selvey, Charlotte-Mecklenberg Police Department
Lieutenant Susan Clark, Chicago Police Department
Deputy Chief Calvin Cunigan, Dallas Police Department
Lieutenant Regina Smith, Dallas Police Department
Gary Tittle, Dallas Police Department
Sergeant James Weiss, Detroit Police Department
Kimberly Armstrong, Edmonton (Canada) Police Service
Captain David Gott, Houston Police Department
Commander Eric Smith, Los Angeles County Sheri’s Department
Lieutenant Michael Parker, Los Angeles County Sheri’s Department
Lieutenant Temple Carpenter, Miami-Dade Police Department
Lieutenant Carrie Mazelin, Monterey Park Police Department
Deputy Chief Marlon Dello, New Orleans Police Department
Deputy Commissioner Richard Ross, Philadelphia Police Department
Captain Carol Scott-Abrams, Philadelphia Police Department
Lieutenant John Echols, Philadelphia Police Department
Assistant Chief Andy Anderson, Phoenix Police Department
9
Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
Captain Steve Campbell, Phoenix Police Department
Captain Kim Humphries, Phoenix Police Department
Lieutenant Linda Johnson, Phoenix Police Department
Jerry Tidwell, San Francisco Police Department
Kieran Walshe, Victoria (Australia) Police Department
Maureen O’Connell, Metropolitan Police Department (Washington, D.C.)
Allison Hart, moderator of the rst two large assemblies
anks to the sta who did all the behind-the-scenes work:
Senior Management Analyst Teri Dixon, Los Angeles Police Department,
who from the inception of the grant coordinated resources and carried
a huge portion of the administrative workload.
Matthew Barge, Police Assessment Resource Center
Lieutenant Paul Torrence, Los Angeles Police Department
Police Service Representative Larita Henderson, Los Angeles Police
Department
Captain William Eaton, Los Angeles Police Department
Regana Sellars, Dallas Police Department
11
Introduction
Introduction
On May 5, 2005, the Los Angeles Police Department was awarded a
grant by the U.S. Department of Justice Oce of Community Oriented
Policing Services to convene and coordinate the National Internal
Aairs Community of Practice group. e initial purpose of the National
Internal Aairs group was to create an opportunity for major city police
departments to come together in real time on an ongoing basis to share
and develop standards and best practices in Internal Aairs work and
share these products with the wider eld of policing. In the end, the
group learned considerably more. e group consisted of 12 major city
and county police agencies in the United States. Many other agency
1
representatives and advisors contributed ideas and the dialog that
ultimately shaped this document.
e group learned that even where we expected commonality in
practice there was much more disparity than expected. We learned that
the denitions of terms shared were not always universal. Where we
assumed there would be shared denitions, the group found that the
assumption was wrong. A large part of the time on this project was spent
trying to agree on the terms common to each agency.
We also discovered that profound dierences among state and local
laws, collective bargaining agreements, and organizational and political
cultures are factors in the struggle to reach commonality. ere were
also striking dierences among the investigative models, processes, and
structures among the participating agencies.
We learned that ensuring ethical conduct is an organizational
responsibility, not just of Internal Aairs because Internal Aairs
is not an isolated agency function. It is integral to a more complex
interrelationship among entities within the agency that had not been
seen as interrelated before. ese include recruit and in-service training,
risk managers, lawyers representing the agency in litigation, and agency
members who interact with labor organizations.
e project rearmed that Internal Aairs serves two communities—law
enforcement and the general public—and Internal Aairs is essential in
building and maintaining mutual trust and respect between agencies and
the public.
1
Although the term “Agency” in this report intends to denote the local law enforcement entity
responsible for the general policing of a city, county, township, or other politically autonomous
local body, the principles of the procedures and ndings herein will likely be applicable to law
enforcement entities of other kinds.
12
Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
We did nd that we faced many common issues, including a lack of
resources, lack of understanding of the Internal Aairs function by many
members of the agencies and by the public, and the need to be able to
continue the community of practice discourse begun in this project.
Despite the sometimes striking disparity among the methods, models,
and other features of the various agencies’ Internal Aairs processes
(see the Appendix at the end of this document), the group was still able
to nd ways of eectively accomplishing the Internal Aairs mission in
dierent ways.
Inevitably the question should be asked: why didn’t the Internal Aairs
community of practice come up with best practices the same way
investigators of homicides and narcotics come up with best practices?
What we found was that because Internal Aairs investigates police
ocers, a unique set of challenges is created that do not exist in
typical criminal investigations. ese challenges are not solved with
technical solutions because the challenges are not merely technical. e
challenges include the dynamics of state and local laws, employment
rights, collective bargaining agreements, community relationships and
expectations, and organizational and political cultures.
It was not a goal of the group to fashion rigid and conning rules or
standards binding all American law enforcement agencies. Neither
was it the goal to impose best practices that would create a single
measuring stick with which to judge each agency. Rather, the eort
focused on drafting a set of general principles and guidelines, around
which consensus had taken shape, that articulate the fundamental
presumptions and values underlying the role of Internal Aairs in
contemporary American policing.
We remain condent that police departments, managed properly, have
the capacity to police themselves in a manner that enhances public
trust. We believe that agencies that objectively and thoroughly police
themselves, yet are accountable to the public and civilian authority,
are stronger than agencies policed from the outside where internal
accountability is not a priority.
13
1.0 Intake
1.0 Intake
“Intake” denotes the process of receiving a complaint. ere is a wide
range of accepted intake practices. e range of practices ows from the
political, legal, labor-relational, and other factors incidentally aecting
agencies using them.
e widest possible net should be thrown open at intake to receive all
complaints from all possible sources of complaint. While the procedures
for investigation and resolution of these complaints may dier
depending upon their nature, it is a recommended practice to take in all
complaints. Moreover, complaints as a whole provide the agency with
insight as to how it is perceived by the public. Law enforcement is not
doing its job if the public as a whole or in part believes the police are not
eective, ethical, or respectful.
Section Topics:
1.1 What a complaint is and who may le one.
1.2 How a complaint can be transmitted and what forms it can take.
1.3 Receiving complaints at agency facilities.
1.4 Availability of complaint forms or other means of ling complaints.
1.5 Dissuading complainants.
1.6 Tracking complaints.
1.7 Complaint acknowledgments.
1.8 Auditing complaint intake.
1.9 Complaints and lawsuits.
14
Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
1.1 What a complaint is and who may le one. Each event of
alleged inappropriate behavior is an allegation, whether reported verbally
or by other depiction. A complaint is one or more allegations by any
person that an employee of an agency, or the agency itself, has behaved
inappropriately as dened by the person making the allegation. e
person making the allegation is a complainant.
Commentary
Each agency should require that every complaint from the public be
received and evaluated to determine the nature of the agency’s response
to the complaint. Because complaints can literally be anything from
irrational statements to clear reports of criminal corruption, intelligent
evaluation of each complaint at intake is crucial.
e complaint process from intake to nal disposition should be clear
to all involved, and should include at least a general description of the
categories the agency uses to group complaints and the procedures for
handling each category. e descriptions and procedures should be in
writing and easily accessible to the public.
Employee complaints best resolvable beyond the realm of Internal
Aairs
2
should be redirected to other areas of the agency as the nature
of the complaint dictates (e.g., supervisory issues, personal grievances,
employee disputes, etc.).
1.2 How a complaint can be transmitted and what
forms it can take. To the extent permitted by law, a complaint
should be received whether presented orally, in writing, or in some
other reasonably intelligible form. e point is to make it as simple
as reasonably possible for anyone, including an arrestee, to present a
complaint without unnecessary burden. e public has a reasonable
expectation that an agency presented with a complaint will act in good
faith to accept it.
Public proceedings or lings in which declarations under oath reveal
allegations of misconduct against an agency’s employee should be
considered sources of complaints when the allegations are brought to
the attention of a member of the agency responsible for the intake of
complaints.
2
“Internal Aairs,” denotes the entity or persons within an agency whose
primary function is to investigate the conduct of agency personnel.
15
1.0 Intake
Nonsupervisory employees to whom a complaint is made should be
required to summon a supervisory employee to receive the complaint.
If a supervisor is not reasonably or practically available, the employee
should explain to the complainant how to promptly meet with a
supervisor and/or the process of ling a complaint. A supervisor
receiving a complaint against another supervisor of similar rank should,
when practical, summon a superior ocer to receive the complaint.
Commentary
Nonsupervisory employees are ordinarily not trained to investigate
complaints, not invested with the authority to do so, and may have
conicts of interest in accepting complaints against their peers. Likewise,
a supervisor who receives a complaint against a peer or superior ocer
should as promptly as possible involve a superior ocer in the complaint
receipt process to avoid a conict of interest. e most pressing conict
of interest to avoid is that of one employee investigating a complaint
against a co-worker with whom the employee may have or benet from a
personal relationship.
1.3 Receiving complaints at agency facilities. An agency
should receive complaints at any of its facilities ordinarily accessible to
the public regardless of the assignment of the employee complained
against. Where an agency can arrange to have complaints received and
properly processed by local government ocials at locations other than
police facilities, the agency should do so.
Commentary
A complainant should have a wide choice of locations to le a complaint.
Permitting nonpolice ocials of an agency’s local government (such as
the city clerk, ombudsman, etc.) to accept complaints gives complainants
neutral locations to present their complaints without fear. Such
arrangements should include at least an understanding among the local
ocials that they need to promptly present the complainant information
to the agency’s Internal Aairs.
16
Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
1.4 Availability of complaint forms or other means
of ling complaints. A public complaint form, or other means
to le a complaint, should be available upon request at all units and
patrol stations ordinarily accessible to the public. Information about
how to le a complaint should be available at municipal oces and
other appropriate identied locations. If an agency has a web site, an
electronic version of the complaint form should be on the site, capable
of being lled out and transmitted electronically. e means of collecting
complaint information, whether via written forms or another specic
mechanism, should capture all information necessary to initiate the
intake of the complaint. Whenever practicable, a complainant should
be provided with a copy of the initial intake complaint so that the
complainant can verify that the facts as initially reported were accurately
and completely received. If the information on such a complaint form is
transferred to a dierent numbered and tracked document, such as an
ocial internal form for registering complaints, the original complaint
form should be retained and led with the ocial form.
e complaint process should accommodate all languages spoken by a
substantial proportion of residents of the region. Similarly, brochures
explaining the procedure for the ling and investigation of complaints
should be available in those languages wherever a complaint can be
made. ere should be signage in English and those other languages at
each patrol station or other unit informing persons of their right to make
a complaint and the availability of personnel to assist in the process.
Commentary
ese practices are recommended to facilitate the making of a complaint
and establish methods so that each complaint can be accounted for.
While many agencies use dedicated forms for public use in making
complaints, others accept letters of complaint or take verbal complaints
via a dedicated process and thus have no such public complaint forms.
Where agencies do not use dedicated forms, there must still be a specic,
dedicated process for tracking complaints once received.
Because American cities and towns are increasingly multicultural
and multilingual, agencies should consider acquiring resources to
accommodate receiving and investigating complaints made in languages
common in their jurisdictions.
17
1.0 Intake
1.5 Dissuading complainants. e public complaint process
should not discourage, dishearten, or intimidate complainants or give
them cause for fear. Unless required by law, a complaint need not be
under oath or penalty of perjury. Unless required by law, no threats
or warnings of prosecution or potential prosecution for ling a false
complaint should be made orally or in writing to a complainant or
potential complainant. Practices such as running warrant or immigration
checks on complainants at intake solely because they are complainants
should not be tolerated.
Commentary
Employees who in bad faith attempt to dissuade complainants from
ling a complaint or who attempt to convince a complainant to withdraw
his or her complaint should be subject to discipline. However, where
an agency has an ocially sanctioned and regulated mediation process
available as an alternative to the complaint process, a good-faith oer to
a complainant to enter the alternative process is encouraged.
State law may require a complaint to be signed and made under oath
or penalty of perjury. State law also may require warnings of potential
prosecution for ling false complaints.
1.6 Tracking complaints. Every complaint should be tracked
through nal disposition. e tracking system should be automated,
where feasible, and capable of capturing in separate data elds
information regarding the complaint important for case tracking. e
tracking system should alert investigators and those responsible for
management of the complaint process when deadlines are about to
expire or have expired.
Commentary
A reliable complaint tracking system is a means not only of managing
cases but of providing public accountability for the follow-through on
intake complaints. Absent a tracking system, an agency has no way of
eciently verifying that its cases are properly assigned, that investigators
are providing due diligence, or that cases have been completed. For
jurisdictions where statutes of limitation apply to complaints, system-
generated alerts warning of impending benchmark or statute deadlines
can help prevent cases from falling outside statutory time limits and
avoid the appearance of deliberate indierence.
18
Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
An example of one ecient means of ensuring that complaints are
tracked from inception through disposition is the use of one ocial,
agency-authorized complaint form. Such forms should contain a unique
identier, such as a number, that allows them to be audited and tracked.
All original, ocial complaint information forms, as well as the nalized
investigation, should be housed according to clear written procedures
including at least the location(s) of the les, security measures to protect
them, and the authorizations required to access them.
1.7 Complaint acknowledgments. A written acknowledgment of
a complaint or a receipt should be provided to the complainant in person
or by mail or e-mail promptly and should be documented in a retrievable
manner. It should include a reference number, complete synopsis of
the complaint, and the identity of the investigator or other responsible
person and his or her contact information.
In some agencies, a complainant orally states the subject matter of the
complaint to law enforcement personnel who then put the complaint in
writing. In such instances, there is a potential for inaccuracy or omission.
e complainant should be permitted to review for accuracy any oral
complaint reduced to writing by any agency personnel. e complainant
should receive a copy of any such complaint. If a complainant appears
in person, he or she should be provided the opportunity to review and
correct what has been written. If the complainant calls in, the complaint
should be read back to the complainant for review and correction.
Commentary
A complainant should be certain that the complaint has been taken
down completely and accurately. e complainant should have written
notice that a complaint has been received and how it will be handled.
When practical, the name and contact phone number of the investigator
responsible for the complainant’s case should be provided to the
complainant. is saves time for the complainant and the agency when
the complainant has a need to speak with the investigator.
1.8 Auditing complaint intake. As a routine matter, an agency
should conduct regular audits to verify that complaints are being taken
properly and to ensure that all employees are adhering to agency rules
and standards.
19
1.0 Intake
Commentary
Some agencies use video cameras or undercover ocers posing as
complainants to test the integrity of its processes for the intake of
complaints. It is not uncommon for organizations concerned with civil
rights to send individuals posing as complainants to conduct similar
tests. Some complaint forms ask directly whether any attempt to
intimidate the complainant has been made. However achieved, agencies
should devise means to test whether the reporting systems function
as designed and whether the employees trusted to operate the systems
know what to do and are following the procedures in good faith.
1.9 Complaints and lawsuits. Complaints that are legal claims
against the agency or any of its personnel for on- or o-duty conduct
under color of authority should be coordinated with the agency’s or city’s
risk management unit and the attorneys representing and defending the
city in civil matters.
Any civil lawsuit or civil claim led against a municipality, agency, or law
enforcement personnel for misconduct on duty or o duty under color of
authority should be handled as a complaint.
Agencies should consider creating rules requiring employees who are the
subject of lawsuits alleging o-duty misconduct under color of authority
to report the lawsuit without delay to their Internal Aairs unit or their
commanding ocer.
Commentary
Any lawsuit or claim that alleges misconduct, including those led with
another governmental or administrative agency, should be immediately
brought to the attention of the agency’s Internal Aairs unit or its
equivalent. Unless the claim is investigated elsewhere within the agency’s
government, it should be processed as a complaint at intake.
A lawsuit alleging on-duty activities would ordinarily be served on the
ocer and employer, putting both on notice of the alleged facts. is is
dealt with in an earlier section of this report. However, lawsuits regarding
o-duty actions under color of authority may not only implicate
employer liability, but may reveal that an ocer has violated agency rules
regarding o-duty behavior.
21
2.0 Classication of Complaints
Promptly upon intake, it is the responsibility of the Internal Aairs
unit to classify the complaint for purposes of determining where,
when, and how the complaint will be investigated and resolved. It is
helpful to classify complaints into either of two categories: criminal
or administrative. A complaint that is criminal is investigated quite
dierently from a complaint that is administrative. Criminal misconduct
may lead to prosecution and jail or prison. An administrative complaint
may lead only to internal discipline or other corrective action.
Some agencies break administrative complaints into subclassications
of personnel complaints and service complaints. Personnel complaints
address alleged misconduct by an employee. Service complaints address
problems in the provision of service not linked in any way to an
employee’s possible misconduct, such as a complaint that the agency’s
response times are routinely too long.
Section Topics:
2.1 Criminal complaints.
2.2 When criminal prosecution is declined.
2.3 Internal administrative complaints.
2.4 Holding administrative complaints in abeyance during criminal
proceedings.
2.0 Classication of Complaints
22
Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
2.1 Criminal complaints. As soon as is practicable, complaints
alleging possible criminal misconduct of an agency member should be
separated, classied as a criminal complaint, and handled accordingly.
Criminal misconduct is when there is reasonable suspicion to believe
that the agency member committed a crime. A decision not to classify
a possibly criminal complaint as such should be approved by the unit
commander of Internal Aairs or its equivalent or the agency head or
designee according to protocols agreed upon with the District Attorney.
If that concurrence is verbal, Internal Aairs should reduce it to writing
and place it in the le. Declination of prosecution should not be the sole
basis for closing the agency’s administrative investigation associated
with the criminal case.
Because agencies typically have rules making it an act of misconduct
to commit a crime, agencies should consider creating rules requiring
ocers arrested or named as a principal to a crime to report that to their
agency’s Internal Aairs or to their commanding ocer. Consideration
should also be given to requiring employees who know that their fellow
employee has been arrested or named as a criminal principal to report
that fact to Internal Aairs or to their commanding ocer.
Commentary
Questions arise whether complaints of excessive or unnecessary force
must always be dealt with as a criminal complaint. A suggestion for a
resolution of the question is that a complaint that alleges or suggests
that an ocer’s use of force was willfully, intentionally, recklessly,
or knowingly excessive or unreasonable should be classied and
investigated as a criminal complaint. Some agencies have negotiated
agreements over what complaints need to be prosecuted or presented to
prosecutors for a decision on prosecution. It is recommended that each
agency establish an explicitly codied protocol for the presentation of
cases for potential prosecution. Any doubt or uncertainty with respect
to a criminal classication should be resolved in consultation with the
District Attorney or other local prosecutor.
23
2.0 Classication of Complaints
2.2 When criminal prosecution is declined. An Internal
Aairs administrative investigation should be opened to gather facts
and determine whether there is sucient evidence to take disciplinary
employment action against an employee who is under investigation for
a criminal matter. e declination by a prosecutor to proceed criminally
or a dismissal of charges or a not guilty judgment or verdict should not
lead to a termination of an administrative investigation given the nature
of prosecutorial discretion and the diering standard of proof (beyond
a reasonable doubt) and admissibility of evidence in criminal matters in
contrast to civil liability or administrative proceedings (preponderance
of the evidence). Evidence of an employee’s plea of criminal guilt in
court should be among the items collected and considered by an agency
when conducting an administrative investigation associated with the
employee’s criminal case.
Commentary
A criminal investigation focuses on whether a crime has been committed
and concentrates on the specic actions and mental state of the
accused. An administrative investigation of a police ocer, on the other
hand, should look more broadly at the tactical, strategic, and training
implications of a particular incident in conjunction with an examination
of whether agency policy was violated. ere should be an active
administrative investigation of any matter that is also being pursued as a
criminal investigation. e degree to which the two investigations should
proceed in parallel or not is discussed at section 2.4.
2.3 Internal administrative complaints. A complaint made
by an agency employee alleging criminal conduct of another agency
employee should be promptly received and processed as a complaint by
Internal Aairs. However, an employee’s report of another’s violation
of administrative policies should be handled according to the policies of
the agency, which could in many cases reasonably involve a process other
than a complaint.
Commentary
at Internal Aairs should handle criminal allegations made by one
employee against another is a generally agreed upon procedure. However,
the policies and customs of agencies throughout the country concerning
the way agency-specic administrative rule violations are handled vary
greatly. Philosophies of internal discipline, leadership styles of agency
heads, the discretion given to supervisors and commanding ocers to
determine how employee behavior is dealt with, and factors related to
tracking potentially at-risk behaviors aect whether a complaint will ensue.
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Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
When determining whether to create a complaint based solely on an
administrative agency rule violation, some important considerations
which would tend to suggest a complaint include at least the following:
1. e employee has a history of behavior of a kind similar to the
instant case.
2. e behavior appears to be invidious discrimination.
3. e act is a breach of ethics.
4. e agency rules require discharge if the allegation is true.
5. No less formal intervention is deemed likely to change the
employee’s behavior.
Conversely, where the conditions above do not exist and counseling,
training, an employee development plan, remedial agreement, or other
alternative to traditional discipline seem a reasonably worthwhile option,
consideration should be given to dealing with internal matters creatively
and without a complaint.
2.4 Holding administrative complaints in abeyance
during criminal proceedings. Each agency should create a
protocol for determining how to proceed with an administrative
complaint while a criminal case based on the same facts is pending.
Commentary
It is common practice to hold an administrative investigation in abeyance
during the pendency of a criminal investigation based on the same
facts. It is often the desire of the prosecutor that the investigations
be consecutive out of concern that compelled statements in the
administrative investigation, if not handled carefully, may taint the
criminal investigation. On the other hand, consecutive investigations can
prejudice the administrative investigation. e time delay has a negative
impact on the memory and availability of witnesses. It means that a
cloud lingers over the employee for a long time. e longer eventual
administrative discipline, retraining, or corrective action is postponed,
the less eective and meaningful it will be. Moreover, a lengthy delay
undermines public trust and condence that the agency is ecient and
is taking speedy action to remedy police misconduct, thereby increasing
public cynicism about law enforcement taking care of its own. If an
agency does conduct consecutive rather than concurrent investigations,
the agency should keep the complainant informed as to the progress of
the investigations on a regular basis.
25
2.0 Classication of Complaints
Some agencies conduct contemporaneous criminal and administrative
investigations. To do so eliminates the negative features of consecutive
investigations described above. Contemporaneous investigations are
more dicult to perform because of the strict necessity of keeping
the two investigations separate. Additionally, contemporaneous
investigations may involve double interviews of witnesses and a
potential for conicts in the record. Unless otherwise prohibited by
law, the facts gathered in the criminal investigation can be shared with
those conducting the administrative investigation; the reverse is not
necessarily true.
Great caution must be exercised to avoid a compelled statement or
the fruits of a compelled statement from leaking into the criminal
investigation. To do otherwise risks losing the potential criminal
prosecution because of constitutional violations of the privilege against
self-incrimination. For example: Compelled statements should not be
disclosed during the course of an administrative investigation. Just as in
any investigation, it is bad investigative practice to permit witnesses to
learn what other witnesses have said. Accordingly, no witness, including
other agency ocer witnesses, or other subjects, should be allowed to
see a subject’s compelled statement. And, Internal Aairs investigators
should take care when interviewing witnesses, including agency ocer
witnesses, not to reveal the content of a compelled statement.
Prosecutors have discretion as to how much time it will take to decide
whether to proceed criminally. In some particularly sensitive cases,
prosecutors have been known to take a year or more to make this
decision. In the interim, the internal administrative investigation
is neglected. Memories grow stale. Discipline, if any, is long-
delayed. Accordingly, some agencies proceed with the administrative
investigation, including taking a compelled statement from the subject
ocer, before the prosecutor has made a decision. e prosecutor’s
views should be solicited in this regard and a collective decision should
be made to best protect the interests of both the criminal and internal
investigation.
27
3.0 Investigation
3.0 Investigation
e guiding principle informing this section of the report is that all
complaints made by members of the public and all internal complaints of
a serious nature, as determined by the agency, must be investigated. e
extensiveness of the investigation may vary from complaint to complaint
commensurate with the seriousness and complexity of the case. Some
small number may be capable of resolution after a cursory or truncated
investigation.
No complaint investigation should be closed or otherwise terminated
without the concurrence of the commander of Internal Aairs at
minimum.
Internal Aairs should be the guarantor that every investigation
undertaken by its agency of its own personnel fullls its investigative
mission. All reasonable steps should be taken to assure that every
investigation is free from conict of interest, bias, prejudice, or self-
interest. Accordingly, investigations should, where reasonable and
feasible, be conducted by an Internal Aairs unit that reports directly
to the agency head or designated immediate subordinate deputy or
assistant agency head. Agencies should have a policy to address any
instance where Internal Aairs confronts a conict of interest or believes
that it cannot conduct an objective and unbiased investigation, such as
when the agency head or Internal Aairs commander is the subject of
the complaint.
Whenever it is necessary to delegate certain investigations to the eld,
Internal Aairs should monitor such investigations for quality and due
diligence, and take appropriate action if either is lacking. Internal Aairs
should be empowered to remand investigations to the eld for further
work until Internal Aairs has determined that the investigative quality
meets its standards.
e rules and procedures for an investigation must be framed to ensure
its integrity, thoroughness, and fairness. To the extent possible under
state or local law or existing union contracts, investigations should be
prompt and present no opportunities for the fabrication or distortion
of testimony or evidence. e rights of ocers under law or pursuant
to union contracts should be carefully observed. Internal Aairs is
responsible for upholding these rights while at the same time ensuring a
timely and proper investigation.
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Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
In some Internal Aairs units, it is common practice for Internal
Aairs to propose a nding to the ultimate decision-maker. Sometimes,
Internal Aairs also proposes discipline to the ultimate decision-maker.
In those agencies, the investigators are seen as closest to the facts and
as professionals best positioned to weigh evidence and testimony. In
those agencies, Internal Aairs plays a role in assuring the consistency,
accuracy, and appropriateness of the disciplinary process.
In other Internal Aairs units, the role of the investigator is narrowly
dened to producing a neutral, objective, and accurate factual summary.
In such agencies, the ability of the chain of command or senior
executives to act as judge and jury to nd facts and impose discipline is
highly valued. In such systems, great importance is placed on allowing
unit commanders wide discretion over those they supervise directly or
indirectly. Furthermore, in those agencies, there is a perceived risk that
investigators may lose neutrality and objectivity if they are permitted to
recommend ndings or discipline.
Both systems have advantages and disadvantages. Either can be eective
as long as Internal Aairs is required to produce a report containing all
relevant and unbiased information needed to fulll the agency’s mission
for the case.
Section Topics:
3.1 “Complete investigation” dened.
3.2 Frequent or chronic complainants.
3.3 Special needs of criminal investigations.
3.4 Cases Internal Aairs should investigate.
3.5 Cases Internal Aairs should relegate.
3.6 Recommendations for time limits.
3.7 e use of administrative leave.
3.8 Electronic recordings of interviews.
3.9 Standards of investigative report quality.
3.10 e use of a chronology.
3.11 Agencies should consider using compliance audits.
3.12 Response to, and review of, lethal-force investigations.
3.13 Lethal-force investigations: interviews and evidence.
3.14 Investigations during lawsuits.
3.15 Post-resignation investigations.
29
3.0 Investigation
3.1 “Complete investigation” dened. A preliminary
investigation should encompass an eort to gather key statements or
evidence if reasonably attainable. e goal of a preliminary investigation
is to determine if the complaint should be further investigated and, if so,
by whom.
A “complete investigation” is one which includes all relevant information
required to achieve the purpose of the inquiry. A complete investigation
is not necessarily exhaustive. ere are many inquiries where a good faith
professional judgment determines that sucient relevant evidence of all
points of view has been acquired, and where collecting more information
merely would be cumulative.
One should expect of a complete investigation that a competent
adjudicator will be able to make a nding without resorting to surmise,
prejudice, or assumption of facts at issue. A complete investigation
should take place where the allegations, if true, would likely result
in formal discipline. Likewise, a complete investigation should be
considered if it appears from a preliminary review that an agency’s
policy, standard, or training may be a factor in unintended consequences
apparent in the complaint.
Any decision not to proceed to a complete investigation should be
made by the commander of Internal Aairs with a written explanation
included in the le. Nonetheless, a small number of complaints will
allege facts that defy science and reason and accordingly do not merit
more than cursory investigation and should be closed with a nding
that the complainant’s claim was impossible to investigate because the
allegations were physically, logically, or technically impossible under
any reasonable construal. An example of such a claim would be that an
agency’s space satellite is continuously piercing the complainant’s brain
with laser beams, or that the agency’s employees are stealing her internal
organs from her every time she goes to the market. Complaints closed in
this manner should be reviewed by the commander of Internal Aairs as
a check against improper closure.
Commentary
Rules for complaint processing vary dramatically and for many reasons.
Arriving at exactly one process applicable to all agencies in all cases
appears to be impracticable. In general, agencies have to consider how
much decision authority they are willing to repose in each part of
the process, how much oversight they want to create to monitor the
results of the exercise of that authority, and what counts as a complete
investigation given at least the factors described above.
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Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
3.2 Frequent or chronic complainants. Some complaints
are lodged by frequent complainants whose previous complaints have
uniformly been found to lack a basis in fact. ese complaints should
not be summarily closed. A preliminary investigation, however, may be
satisfactory to establish that the current complaint lacks a basis in fact or
is a duplicate of facts alleged in another complaint. e complaint should
be closed with a nding that there was no basis of fact or that it was a
duplicate, after review by the Internal Aairs commander.
Commentary
So-called chronic complainants should not be dismissed out-of-hand.
Persons who make unfounded reports on some occasions may accurately
report misconduct on another. e predicament this creates can worsen
as the number of unfounded complaints increases or the allegations
become more dangerous if true. e following is a reasonable strategy to
consider.
Where the number of unfounded complaints has gone beyond what is
reasonable (20 or so within a year, for example), determine whether a
pattern exists of reporting events that are one-on-one. If such a pattern
exists, consider doing recorded covert audits of the complainant or of
ocers against whom the complainant has made allegations. If well-
planned covert audits show that either the complainant lies or that
the ocers behave properly, these results should be considered when
receiving future complaints from the same person. is is obviously very
resource-intensive and, in fact, may be beyond the resources of some
agencies. But it can be a resource saver if the complainant has become an
extraordinary burden.
Other creative strategies should be sought. e point in creating a
strategy to deal with a chronic complainant is to be reasonable about the
strategy and its expectations, recognizing that whether every complaint
is investigated exhaustively or each is handled as a merely patterned
report, the agency assumes a risk of either wasting important resources
or missing a true report among the noise of the false.
3.3 Special needs of criminal investigations. A criminal
investigation of an agency employee, particularly one involving a felony
or crime of moral turpitude, is so serious that an agency should consider
extraordinary measures to ensure that the investigation is as thorough
and independent of conicts of interest as possible. Ideally, an Internal
Aairs team trained in criminal investigations would handle such cases
and answer only to the agency head or designee. If Internal Aairs does
31
3.0 Investigation
not have a criminal investigation team, another team of investigators
should be selected for its objectivity, integrity, and skill to handle the
case, and the team should answer only to the agency head or designee for
the progress and ndings of the case and determination of ling charges.
Having investigators from the supervisory ranks would be desirable to
avoid conicts of interest, as would having investigators from a chain
of command outside that of the accused employee if the accused is a
supervisor or manager.
Commentary
Internal Aairs units typically report to the agency head or designee and
thus have certain independence. In some agencies, there is a specialized
unit within Internal Aairs dedicated to criminal investigations. In other
agencies, certain criminal investigations are handled outside of Internal
Aairs by a detective or homicide unit, particularly in cases of ocer-
involved shootings. In yet other agencies, the District Attorney may have
investigators who conduct some or all criminal investigations and may
present a matter to a grand jury. In some instances, an agency might ask
another agency, such as the FBI, or an independent prosecutor, or a blue
ribbon commission to conduct an independent, outside investigation
or to monitor an internal investigation. From time to time, it has been
proposed that certain sensitive investigations be conducted by a specially
appointed independent prosecutor.
e goal in all instances is to ensure that the case is properly investigated
and presented to the District Attorney for ling consideration. Further,
the degree to which the public and the agency respect the conclusion of
the case depends greatly on the agency’s choice of investigative process
and personnel.
3.4 Cases Internal Aairs should investigate. Internal Aairs
should conduct all serious administrative investigations, including but
not limited to ocer-involved shootings, in-custody deaths, alleged
constitutional violations, allegations of racial proling or discriminatory
policing or racial prejudice, dishonesty, drug use, sexual misconduct,
cases handled for other jurisdictions, interagency cases, and cases
referred directly by the agency head or command sta. Internal Aairs
should also conduct all administrative investigations of allegations
of misconduct that are likely to result in litigation against the agency
or its members. Unless there is a specialized unit to handle internal
complaints by employees of discrimination, sexual harassment, and
other unlawful employment practices, Internal Aairs should conduct
such investigations.
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Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
Internal Aairs should investigate all allegations of misconduct of
command-level personnel with the exceptions of allegations against the
agency head or in any instance where there is an apparent conict of
interest. A complaint against the agency head should be investigated by
expert investigators outside the agency acquired by and operating under
the auspices of the authority responsible for appointing the agency head.
Commentary
Certain internal investigations are suciently serious that they should
be conducted by the Internal Aairs unit in order to produce an objective
and competent investigation which the general public and members of
the agency will accept as trustworthy and credible. Some smaller agencies
without a full-time Internal Aairs unit should consider contracting with
an independent external investigator on a case-by-case basis. So, too,
should a larger agency to avoid actual or perceived conicts of interest.
3.5 Cases Internal aairs should relegate. Investigations
of less-serious allegations of misconduct by the rank and le
should be conducted by investigators where the agency believes the
investigations can be properly done. Complaints alleging simple
discourtesy or rudeness, without any suggestion of discrimination
against a particular person or group, could be investigated at the unit
level. Similarly, complaints by the public regarding trac citations and
trac enforcement could be investigated at the unit level. Internal
or external allegations of minor infractions of agency regulations or
policies, preventable trac collisions, or minor performance issues also
are appropriate for investigation at the unit level. Alleged excessive or
unreasonable minor uses of force not involving death, serious injury,
or hospital admittance or willful, intentional, reckless, or knowing
misconduct may be appropriate for investigation at the unit level.
Internal Aairs should monitor eld investigations for quality and due
diligence, and take appropriate action if either is lacking. Internal Aairs
should be empowered to remand investigations to the eld for further
work until Internal Aairs has determined that the investigative quality
meets its standards.
Commentary
Because many investigations do not require the expertise of Internal
Aairs investigators, assigning those investigations to the employee’s
chain of command for unit-level investigation can be an excellent
resource saving. It can also reveal to an employee’s chain of command
information about the workplace and personnel that they would not
33
3.0 Investigation
know if they were not investigating the complaint. is benet is often
missed in assessing who will investigate a given complaint but should be
seriously considered. Given that command ocers and supervisors are
accountable for their commands and their people, they should also be
among the rst to see complaints and get the rst opportunity to act as
leaders in resolving performance and behavior problems.
e absence of investigative expertise of local chain-of-command
investigators can cause problems, however. Without the training and
experience of Internal Aairs, local investigators may not produce the
quality needed to fulll the investigative mission. Time commitments to
conduct administrative investigations by eld supervisors may conict
with their primary responsibility of eld supervision.
It is possible that the command ocers in a chain of command can
oversee such investigations adequately and remand for improvement
substandard investigations. Yet consideration should be given to having
Internal Aairs be the nal judge of investigative quality with the nal
decision-making power to return to the chain of command substandard
investigations for improvement. An advantage to having Internal Aairs
manage investigative quality control is that it is most likely to provide
increasing consistency and quality. Another advantage is that Internal
Aairs’ review of all complaints can reveal trends of investigative or
leadership deciencies that Internal Aairs can help resolve through
agency-wide training.
3.6 Recommendations for time limits. Completion of Internal
Aairs investigations should occur as rapidly as is reasonably necessary
to fulll the investigative mission. In all instances, however, an internal
investigation should be completed within a reasonable time before any
applicable statute of limitations or other bar to ocer discipline has run
out. It is preferable to conclude investigations within 180 days.
Commentary
Given localized statute requirements and wide variation in personnel and
nancial resources available to devote to Internal Aairs investigations,
a specic, global standard for all agencies stating the time by which an
internal investigation should be concluded is not feasible. Agencies with
more limited stang may, in good faith, require a longer duration of time
for completing an investigation.
Statutory limits on investigative duration should be the minimum
standard. Consideration should be given to the broader principles of the
policy. It is valuable, for example, to complete investigations promptly
34
Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
out of respect to employees, recognizing that they suer stress awaiting
the disposition their case. It is also valuable to the development of
public trust when citizens are notied that their complaints have been
investigated promptly. ere is value in taking swift corrective action to
help a wayward employee avoid further problems. An agency can exploit
the opportunity inherent in an investigative duration policy to enunciate
broader principles which at once inspire prompt investigations and
inspire respect for people.
3.7 e use of administrative leave. During the pendency
of an internal investigation, an agency may place involved ocers on
administrative leave or reassignment should they be determined to pose
a risk to themselves, the agency, or the community; should their presence
become disruptive to the successful completion of the investigation; or if
the agency determines that termination is likely.
Commentary
ere often are legal restrictions on whether an agency can suspend with
or without pay, reassign, remove peace ocer’s powers, or take other
actions to prevent a peace ocer under investigation from becoming a
threat or liability during an investigation. While taking such actions may
well be within the agency’s management rights, no decision should be
executed without reasonable justication. is standard helps protect
the agency not only from legal attack, but forces the agency to avoid
knee-jerk reactions to embarrassing or politically frightening events. It
also helps avoid conicts with labor unions. Finally, using a reasonable
justication standard can show that the agency is as respectful of the
law as it expects its employees to be, a notion that can accrue to the
credibility of the agency’s investigative conclusions.
3.8 Electronic recordings of interviews. Electronic recording of
the live, word-for-word statements of all interviewees, including accused
employees, is the best way to avoid interpretive errors in recounting
statements. Except in covert operations, all recordings should be done
with the full knowledge of everyone involved, with a lead-in statement
by the primary investigator announcing the date, time, and location
of the interview as well as the names and titles of everyone present.
Asking each person in the interview room to self-identify can be helpful
to auditors, stenographers, or others who may need to listen to the
recording later and know who is talking.
Telephone interviews, for the same reasons, likewise should be recorded,
with the understanding that privacy laws usually require explicit notice
to all participants that the phone conversation is being recorded.
35
3.0 Investigation
E-mail interrogatories are occasionally an option because the e-mails
themselves become verbatim electronic records. ey are most useful
when the questioning to be done does not anticipate much follow-up.
To use e-mail interrogatories successfully it is important to ensure that
there is a means of authenticating the identity of the sender and the
receiver, such as using only agency e-mail addresses where policies and
practices prohibit employees from permitting access by persons other
than the intended user.
Commentary
Whether an agency transcribes, summarizes, or paraphrases witness
statements, electronic recordings are the best means of testing the
accuracy of written accounts of interviews. As a form of quality and
integrity control, audits comparing electronic recordings with written
statements should be at least done randomly. Where variances are found,
the cause should be determined and quickly cured. An investigator whose
written statements vary often or greatly from the electronic recordings
should be trained or removed as an investigator: the cost of allowing
interpretive error or intentional misstatement can be of signicant harm
to the agency’s integrity or reputation.
e question about whether video recording should be done occasionally
arises. Practically it is more intrusive, more dicult to do in small areas,
may require special lighting to be successful, and often requires special
training to implement well. It is not necessarily more eective than pure
audio recording in capturing all that is said.
One method of using video recordings that can be seen as helpful to both
labor and management is in cases where the interviewee is being video
recorded pointing to positions on a map, objects in a room, or otherwise
physically re-creating an event that cannot be done fully in just words.
When a video recording is done in good faith only for the purpose of
creating an ostensive record that could not be created merely through
audio, video recording can help the witness explain his account more
richly so the investigators understand it more fully.
Absent exigent circumstances, as restricted by law or contract, agencies
should give employees a reasonable amount of advance warning before
an administrative interview in order for such employees to secure union
or legal representation should they want it. Unless provided by law, an
employee is not automatically entitled to any specic information or
evidence prior to an interview or interrogation, though an agency may
choose to make some information available to an employee and his or
her representative prior to an interview or during an interview on a case-
by-case basis.
36
Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
Questions asked during the interview should be open-ended and non-
leading. ose conducting interviews should take care not to formulate
instantaneous credibility assessments that might bias the investigation.
Investigators should receive ongoing training in interviewing and fact-
nding techniques. Investigators should thoroughly cover in each ocer
interview what information concerning the incident the ocer discussed
or received from other ocers or outside sources.
3.9 Standards of investigative report quality. e
documentation of investigations must be thorough, complete, and as
comprehensive as reasonably necessary. Using standardized forms or
formats helps in quality control, evaluating comprehensiveness and
suciency of content, consistency, and in recordkeeping.
Commentary
Knowing when an investigation is “as comprehensive as reasonably
necessary” is the most basic but often the most dicult task of the
investigation. At the least, the investigation has to answer the questions
posed to it by the allegations. Beyond that, professional training,
experience, and the resulting professional judgment governs at least part
of the determination of investigative depth. Furthermore, the report
should provide the decision-maker with enough information to arrive at
a well-based nding.
Investigative Report Standards
To achieve the investigative mission, each investigative report should
meet these minimum standards:
1. All allegations are clearly stated and clearly answered.
2. All relevant facts bearing on the truth of each allegation are clearly
stated.
3. All evidence (e.g., photos, recordings, etc.) is included or its means of
retrieval specied.
4. Contact and identication information for all persons interviewed
and for the investigator(s) is included.
5. e report is impartial, with no bias for or against any party.
37
3.0 Investigation
Beyond minimum standards, consideration should be given to assessing
report quality according to at least these standards:
1. e report is logically organized with the aim of helping the reader
understand it.
2. Its language is clear, and where special terms of art are used, they
are dened. e reader should not have to presume or guess the
meaning of a term.
3. It avoids conclusionary statements wherever possible.
4. Sentences and paragraphs are direct, simple, and easy to
understand, using the fewest words to clearly convey the point.
5. Estimates of time, distance, or other quantities should be as precise
as reasonably useful, but need not be precise beyond that.
6. Unless explicitly permitted by agency policy, personal opinions
should be avoided. If they are permitted, they should include
explicit evidence to support the opinion.
Standardized Forms
Standardized forms and formats have advantages and disadvantages.
Basic forms, such as the intake complaint form, fare well having
essential information required on them, such as names, dates, locations,
contact information, etc. Formats for the investigative narratives and
adjudication documents can also be helpful in creating a template
for investigators and agency auditors to use to ensure that crucial
information is included and is adequate. Consideration should be given
to allowing some variation in formats so that information not ordinarily
included can be if it needs to be. Simply adding an optional heading of
“Additional Information” into any format can achieve this.
Each investigative report should contain a detailed, comprehensive
summary. Although the summary should be impartial, it should also
identify inconsistencies between statements and inconsistencies between
statements and physical evidence.
3.10 e use of a chronology. Internal Aairs should track
and maintain a chronological log of all internal investigations. A log
of the investigation serves to preserve and maintain a history of the
investigation and a means to keep track of the various parts of the
investigation.
38
Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
Commentary
A sound investigative practice common to investigations includes the use
of a chronological log in which investigators make entries as they advance
their investigations. Such a log would typically have entries of the dates,
times, and contact information of each person the investigators called,
interviewed, or attempted to call or interview. e log would include
dates/times/contact information when items were sent for analysis.
Any event that would evince investigative due diligence should be
logged, particularly in jurisdictions with statutes of limitations or where
complaint investigations are subject to discovery in legal proceedings.
Logs allow supervisors to determine the eectiveness of their
investigators and also helps other investigators take over a case when the
original investigator is on leave or is removed from the case. Whether
to exhibit and track due diligence or to ensure investigative quality
and continuity, a chronological log is a simple, eective investigation
management tool that takes little time but oers great benets.
3.11 Agencies should consider using Compliance Audits.
A Compliance Audit is a live test to determine whether policies are
being followed. For example, a Compliance Audit of an agency’s policy
to document all complaints could be done by having someone call in
a complaint and later see if the complaint was documented. Sending
a letter alleging misconduct to the agency and determining whether a
complaint was produced would also be considered a Compliance Audit.
Another example of a Compliance Audit is one in which undercover
ocers, or operatives, unknown to the on-duty ocers pose as citizens,
victims, or suspected criminals to determine how on-duty ocers treat
the public in various controlled conditions. ese typically are video- or
audio-recorded and include a substantial support team to ensure the
secrecy of the operation and the safety of everyone involved. Compliance
Audits can be quite complicated and resource-intensive, and typically
require skilled, experienced undercover operators intensively overseen by
supervisors with similar experience and skill.
Commentary
Where an agency has the resources to conduct them, Compliance
Audits can help the agency detect misconduct before the misconduct is
complained of by the public. Compliance Audits can also help pinpoint
weaknesses in systems, policies, or personnel before anyone is ever
accused of misconduct. Conversely, where well-done Compliance Audits
continually show that the agency’s personnel and policies are working
39
3.0 Investigation
well, this information can be useful in defending against pattern-and-
practice lawsuits, and can argue against some deliberate indierence
claims by plaintis.
e use of Compliance Audits lets the public know that the agency takes
its integrity seriously. While the specic details of each Compliance Audit
should be kept secret to avoid compromising tactics or methods that may
be used again, publicizing the fact that an agency conducts Compliance
Audits can help inspire public trust, especially in jurisdictions with a
history of reputed abuses by agency ocers.
Compliance Audits give agency employees the understanding that they
are not above testing, helping to keep honest people honest. is is
not always received well by employees, however. In some agencies, the
advent of Compliance Audits brought complaints from labor unions that
management was out to get their members or that employees would
stop working for fear of being caught up in a poorly designed or poorly
executed audit. Such comments have some merit, insofar as agencies
who design and execute their Compliance Audits in bad faith hoping
merely to prove their worth by catching someone risk the very problem
some unions have claimed: employees may simply slow or shut down to
avoid getting caught in a bad-faith trap.
One way of avoiding the worst of the employee relations problems
created by Compliance Audits is to design them so that an employee
acting reasonably, albeit not perfectly, would not suer signicant
penalty for an error. If Compliance Audits are set up to ascertain ethical
integrity, careful consideration should be given to whether some minor
infraction would even be mentioned outside the Compliance Audit
unit. If employees continually get penalized for minor infractions in
Compliance Audits designed to catch corruption, Compliance Audits
can be sources of employee bitterness. But if the only products of
Compliance Audits are the detection of acts which are universally known
to be egregious, the Compliance Audits will gain a reputation for catching
only those whom everyone knows should be red.
It is not trivial to ask whether, in a Compliance Audit, an employee
should be rewarded when caught doing the job well. In one large agency,
employees receive a commendatory document when they have not merely
passed an audit, but have done an exemplary job. ese commendations
are not handed out often, but when they are, they are issued months after
the event, the facts are not specied, and the date of the Compliance Audit
is not given so as to avoid having the employees detect the undercover
operators and their methods and expose them later.
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Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
Unit Leadership and Condentiality
e selection of the Compliance Audit unit leader is crucial, as the
judgment of the leader in setting up and responding to employee
behaviors in the Compliance Audits is crucial to the reputation of such
audits throughout the agency. e Compliance Audit unit leader should
operate under, and be able to speak condentially with, the agency head
or the Internal Aairs commander to ensure that his judgment and
actions remain consonant with agency doctrine. e leader would also
have to have a high level of skill in selecting the right people for the unit
and quickly removing those who are not right.
e practices and methods of Compliance Audits are beyond the scope
of this document. But agencies seriously considering the creation of a
unit to perform these kinds of integrity checks should spend the time
to research the units of large agencies with expertise in the complexities
of establishing and running them (such as New York Police Department
and the Los Angeles Police Department). e smaller the agency, the
more dicult it is to create such units without the use of personnel from
other agencies because with agencies small enough for everyone to know
each other, there is no anonymous undercover pool from which to pick.
A solution is to collaborate with other agencies to bring in unknown
undercover ocers to perform Compliance Audits if the protocols,
methods, and tactics are well-designed and universally applied. A written
memorandum of agreement or similar document signed by and trained
through all involved agencies can be extremely useful when interagency
personnel exchanges are involved, especially if the agencies are from
dierent government levels (e.g., state and local, or local and federal).
3.12 Response to, and review of, lethal-force
investigations. All ocer-involved shootings targeting or striking
a human being, all in-custody deaths, and all serious uses of force as
dened by the agency should generate an immediate response to the
scene and an investigation conducted by Internal Aairs, or a team of
investigators with special training in the investigation of ocer-involved
uses of deadly force, regardless of whether a complaint will be led.
An administrative review, independent of any complaint, of a shooting,
in-custody death, or serious use of force should consider the strategic,
tactical, policy, training, and risk management implications of any such
incident, including whether changes to policy, procedures, equipment,
or training might mitigate the eects or reduce the number of similar
incidents in the future.
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3.0 Investigation
To encourage the greatest degree of candor and revelation and to the
extent permitted by law, the review should be handled as a condential
self-critical analysis and should occur in each case regardless of whether
there criminal or disciplinary charges are made.
Commentary
ere are multiple, concurrent purposes for an agency’s investigation
of its ocers’ serious use of force as dened by the agency. First
is to determine whether the ocer used force lawfully. Next is to
determine whether the use of force was within agency policy. Finally,
the investigation oers the agency a unique opportunity to review every
feature of its personnel, policies, training, and other organizational
practices that aect or are aected by ocers’ serious use of force.
Question of Lawfulness
An investigation that fails to provide the necessary relevant facts to
allow a prosecutor to correctly determine whether the ocer’s use of
deadly force was legally justied has failed its investigative mission. e
public and the agency’s ocers expect that at minimum every agency will
investigate to provide sucient evidence to either prosecute the ocer
or to clear the ocer of criminal liability.
Question of Procedural Compliance
A serious force investigation should provide enough evidence to
determine whether the use of force complied with agency rules. In cases
of agency rule violations, it can be helpful to the employee and the
agency to have facts clearly stated in a report so that the internal follow-
up actions will be properly justied and understood. An investigation
that comprehends both the legal and procedural considerations is
optimal.
Self-Critical Analysis
A serious use of force rigorously and candidly examined as a condential
self-critical analysis can be viewed as a research project with the aim
of determining agency best practices throughout its systems, policies,
and personnel by studying successes and failures in their real-world
implementation. A serious use of force is a real-world test not only of
that agency’s organizational rules and systems, but can be a test of the
theories and principles underlying them. ere are few opportunities
like ocers’ serious uses of force where so much can be learned from the
exhaustive investigations typically conducted and expected.
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Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
It is important to consider that those who conduct such post-event
analyses should include those in training, risk management, and
all other agency units where the agency can draw on expertise to
contribute to the discussion and analysis. e agency should seriously
consider including not just high-ranking policy makers in these self-
critical analyses, but also the practitioners at the lowest levels of the
organization who know exactly and really what is taught and performed
in the eld. Outside experts can occasionally be helpful in this regard for
special circumstances or questions beyond the expertise of the agency’s
personnel. In all cases the participants should be explicitly held to a
standard of condentiality such that the content of the discussions are
not released to anyone but the agency head or designee.
3.13 Lethal-force investigations: interviews and
evidence. e process of investigating an agency member’s use of
lethal force requires an extraordinary degree of attention to capturing
and recording the statements of each participant and witness
independently, accurately, and as soon as conditions allow.
Commentary
Given the disparity in the law across the country, in this section and
throughout this document, agencies are best advised to consult with legal
counsel about the applicable rules before implementation.
Unless otherwise required by law and without regard to whether the
investigation is conducted by Internal Aairs or another specialized
unit involved, witness ocers should be physically separated as soon as
possible to avoid even the appearance of collusion. Likewise, members of
the agency either involved in or witnessing the critical incident should
be ordered not to discuss the incident among themselves until after
interviews of all involved agency members have been concluded and
the employees have been explicitly authorized to discuss the matter.
Where law permits, the ocers should be compelled to submit to a
comprehensive, electronically audio-recorded interview by agency
investigators as soon as is practical and reasonable. Except for the
Public Safety Statement (see below), members who were involved in or
witnessed the incident in question should be permitted a reasonable
amount of time to consult individually with legal counsel or a labor
representative telephonically or in person before providing an interview
with agency investigators. For some agencies, a “reasonable amount of
time” can be as much as 3 to 5 hours or more. e point is to balance the
employees’ right to representation with the agency’s responsibility to
conduct its investigation without deleterious delay.
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3.0 Investigation
To prevent incidental collusion, members involved in or witnessing
the incident should not be permitted to consult with legal counsel or
labor representatives collectively or in groups: for example, two or more
members should not be consulting in a group together at the same time
with the same lawyer or labor representative.
Public Safety Statement
A Public Safety Statement is a statement made by an agency member
involved in a lethal-force incident to a rst-responder supervisor who
was not involved in the incident, the purpose of which is to enable the
supervisor to determine what immediate action is needed to nd and
protect injured persons, identify and apprehend the suspect, locate
witnesses, protect the scene and its evidence, identify witnesses, and
otherwise manage the emergency. Where the law permits, an agency
employee is ordered to give the statement and is not permitted to await
representation or refuse to make the statement. e rst—or at least
one of the rst—uninvolved supervisor on scene orders the Public
Safety Statements as soon as possible as part of his or her emergency
management duties, and ideally would note the information to avoid
error in the transmission of the information if needed. Once the
emergency and tactical matters have been resolved, questioning of the
ocers is no longer part of the Public Safety Statement. Below is a set of
questions one agency expects rst-responder supervisors to ask in their
Public Safety Statement transactions:
1. Were you involved in an ocer-involved shooting?
2. How many rounds did you re and in what direction did you re
them?
3. Where were you when you red them?
4. Did any other ocers re any rounds? If so, whom, and where
were they when they red?
5. Is it possible the suspect red rounds at you? If so, from what
direction were the rounds red?
6. Are there any suspects outstanding? If so, describe them, their
direction and mode of travel, and how long ago they left. What
crime(s) are they wanted for? What are they armed with?
7. Is anyone injured? If so, where is he or she?
8. Who witnessed this? Where can we nd them?
9. Are there any weapons or evidence that need to be secured and
protected? If so, where are they?
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Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
Once the emergency is resolved to a static protected scene, the involved
employees are ordered not to discuss the incident with anyone except the
investigators or their legal representative.
e answers to the Public Safety Statement questions help determine
where unseen victims might be: asking where the rounds were red, for
example, allows an immediate area search for places outside the limited
shooting scene where stray bullets could have struck bystanders in
their homes. Knowing the armament, description, and ight mode of a
suspect have obvious emergency utility. All the questions are designed
to acquire crucial emergency information without the delay or depth of
information formal interviews require. at is why, in many jurisdictions,
the Public Safety Statement is compelled. If ocers were allowed to
remain silent, human life could be lost or harmed and criminal evidence
could be compromised or lost.
e investigation team should participate in all scene walk-throughs with
involved or witness ocers. e practice of some investigators to conduct
unrecorded “pre-interviews” of ocers or witnesses prior to formal,
electronically recorded interviews should be discouraged, but the practice
of some agencies to solicit and obtain voluntary statements from ocers
should be encouraged.
In those agencies conducting contemporaneous criminal and
administrative review or investigation, the criminal and administrative
investigators should be empowered, should they choose and to the
extent practicable, to conduct joint criminal-administrative interviews
of all witnesses, including interviews of members of the agency and the
general public. Similarly, where law permits, administrative investigators
should be empowered, should they choose, to take a compelled
statement from the subject ocer or ocers before or after the
criminal investigation as long as great care is taken not to contaminate
or compromise the criminal investigation. In any event, the electronic
recordings from the criminal interview and, if possible, a transcript of
them should be provided to the administrative investigators as soon as
practicable.
In addition to documenting statements, sound investigative practices
include the prompt seizure, preservation, and characterization of physical
evidence and the most accurate depiction of the scene, its physical
dimensions and the positions of all items of physical evidence relative to
the time and place force was used.
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3.0 Investigation
3.14 Investigations during lawsuits. Each agency should decide
as soon as practicable in each case whether the complaint investigation
will be completed before or after a lawsuit on the same set of facts is
concluded. Because the possible nancial, legal, or political consequences
of the decision could be extraordinary, the decision should be made by
the agency head or designee.
Commentary
It is common in some agencies to hold an administrative investigation
in abeyance during the pendency of civil litigation arising out of the
same set of facts. Defense counsel fear conicts in testimony between
administrative interviews and deposition or trial testimony. Defense
counsel also worries that the imposition of administrative discipline or a
nding that a given ocer’s actions were out of policy or unjustied will
prejudice the outcome of the civil litigation.
On the other hand, completing an internal investigation in as timely
a manner as is reasonable, regardless of outside legal proceedings,
helps the agency promptly nd, and if necessary, resolve the questions
or problems underlying the civil claims. e negative aspects of
consecutive criminal and administrative investigations apply with equal
force: witnesses’ memories fade or the witness becomes unavailable;
a cloud hangs over the head of the employee; eventual discipline,
retraining, or corrective action is less meaningful with the passage of
time; and the credibility of the agency in dealing with misconduct is
undermined. Accordingly, some agencies proceed with the administrative
investigation, including taking a compelled statement from the subject
ocer, before the civil litigation is nal. e views of the agency’s defense
counsel in this regard should be solicited but should not necessarily be
controlling.
Civil discovery and trial may create a fuller and more complete record
than typical administrative investigations. Agencies should review, and
consider reopening, an internal investigation if the result of litigation
contains new information indicating misconduct.
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Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
3.15 Post-resignation investigations. Even if an employee
resigns, consideration should be given to investigating the complaint as if
the employee were still employed.
Commentary
e decision to complete the investigation of a complaint against an
employee who has resigned is complex. e decision includes, but is
not limited to, resources, local employment ordinances, interagency
cooperation, agency self-critical analysis, and public condence.
Resources
Continuing the investigation of a resigned employee could consume
resources that might be needed elsewhere. Particularly if the
investigation involves many witnesses, extensive travel, the resource-
consuming retrieval or storage of evidence, the use of investigators who
have other pressing cases to work on, or other situations taxing the
agency’s Internal Aairs resources, resources could be a legitimate factor
in deciding whether to pursue a post-resignation case.
Local Employment Ordinances
e hiring/rehiring practices (including collective bargaining agreements)
of many agencies are often determined by the ordinances of their local
government. ese may include rules requiring the rehire of previous
employees unless there is documentation of reason to reject the rehire.
“Reason to reject” standards can dier among jurisdictions, and an
agency choosing not to complete the complaint investigation may be
forced to rehire a bad employee because of it.
Interagency Cooperation
Because agencies often hire each other’s personnel, a potential employer
may end up hiring a bad employee for want of good information in the
candidate’s prior agency le. If an employee were to resign in lieu of
termination and seek employment elsewhere, the agency he seeks to
get hired by may not be able to determine his worthiness for hire if the
agency he left did not nish the complaint investigation. If the practice
of not completing investigations were widespread, agencies would nd it
more dicult to reject questionable prior-service applicants.
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3.0 Investigation
ere are other means to determine whether an applicant has been a
problem to a previous employer, and it is not necessarily the duty of
one employer to protect potential employers from hiring mistakes. Yet
as homeland security draws law enforcement into more sophisticated
information-sharing relationships of all kinds, the question of how to
document and share information related to the conditions in which an
employee left an agency may become more important. It is not hard to
imagine communities of agencies, particularly those likely to draw from
the same employee pool, creating pacts or memoranda of agreement just
for information on terminated or resigned employees. Such agreements
could help prevent dangerous hiring errors, even a scenario in which
a problem employee resigns upon accusation of passing unauthorized
information only to nd easy access to hiring at another agency.
In short, whether an agency completes a complaint investigation or
not on an employee who has resigned, each agency should consider the
benet of developing local agreements to help determine the protocol for
each agency’s response to a resigned employee’s complaint.
Agency Self-Critical Analysis
Information gained from a complaint can teach an agency about its
policies, personnel, and activities that it may not learn otherwise. e
careful leader will examine the complaint—wherever it is in the process
when the employee resigns—for possible insights that might be gained
if the complaint investigation were comprehensively done. An intuitive
question such as, “What would make an employee feel like she could
get away with this?” may lead to insights about the state of your eld
supervision or your agency’s training. e answer to the question,
“How did this supervisor harass this person for so long without anyone
reporting it?” could lead to insight into the state of your discrimination
enforcement practices. ese kinds of questions do not require any more
than common inquisitiveness and are well within the skill set of most
agency managers.
Public Condence
To complete the investigation reassures the public and agency employees
that all complaints are taken seriously and provides the necessary
safeguards to ensure a truthful outcome.
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4.0 Mediation, Adjudication, and Disposition
4.0 Mediation, Adjudication,
and Disposition
Once a complaint investigation is completed, the agency has to
determine what it will do with it. e agency also has to determine
what it will do with the employee at the conclusion of the adjudication.
is section explores the pathway and some of the most important
considerations of that process.
Section Topics:
4.1 e four basic resolution categories.
4.2 e value of considering commanding ocers’ options.
4.3 Proposed reporting relationship of the head of Internal Aairs.
4.4 Standards for adjudication.
4.5 Penalty assessment and the use of a penalty matrix.
4.6 e advantages of mediation and the conditions of its use.
4.7 Settlement agreements and their value.
4.8 Exploring alternatives to traditional discipline.
4.9 Keeping investigations condential.
4.10 Guidelines for selecting and retaining Internal Aairs investigators.
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Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
4.1 e four basic resolution categories. e ndings in
completed investigations should result in one of four resolutions: 1.
sustained or founded; 2. not sustained or not resolved or unresolved; 3.
exonerated; or 4. unfounded. Some unique state or local laws may require
the addition of further categorical distinctions for some limited special
circumstances.
Commentary
In general terms, a “founded” or “sustained” adjudication means that
the allegations are true by a preponderance of the evidence and that
the conduct at issue is a violation of agency rules. An “unfounded”
adjudication means that the allegations are not true. A “not resolved” or
“unresolved” or “not sustained” adjudication means that the allegations
cannot be proven true or untrue by a preponderance of the evidence.
“Exonerated” means that the conduct at issue occurred but is not a
violation of agency rules.
Dispositions other than the basic four recommended above can be useful
in categorizing outcomes that do not fall neatly into the basic four. One
agency, for example, uses a disposition of “Actions Could Have Been
Dierent” to depict a situation where the employee’s actions were less
than ideal but were not misconduct. e disposition includes check boxes
to indicate what measures were taken to improve performance, including
“Counseling,” “Training,” etc. While such a disposition has shown useful
in the agency, it is based on that agency’s broader disciplinary scheme,
which may not apply to many others. Further, even that agency still also
uses the basic four dispositions above.
Another reason to consider additional dispositions arises for agencies
that use intelligent data systems to monitor employee conduct. e
basic four dispositions are generally informative when assessing an
employee’s discipline history, but increasing the information resolution
or granularity of a tracking or “early intervention” system’s input can also
improve the quality of decisions based on it. e more descriptive the
dispositions, the more the decision-maker knows about the employee
and the greater the decision space for the agency’s leaders.
If an agency chooses to use case dispositions beyond the basic four,
it should do so carefully, employing only those that have a clearly
dened function in its personnel processes. is is particularly true for
agencies with data-driven employee monitoring systems. When doing
annual agency- or unit-wide analyses for trends, results are less useful
if disposition categories change often because comparisons are not
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4.0 Mediation, Adjudication, and Disposition
identically matched. Adding new disposition categories is like adding any
other new eld to a data system: it takes time to acquire enough events to
produce a meaningful comparative dataset, and the smaller the number of
new entries, the longer it often takes to derive meaning from them.
4.2 e value of considering commanding ocers’
options. e recommendations of commanding ocers and their
chain-of-command superiors regarding the adjudications of cases and the
actions taken regarding the accused employees should be considered by
the nal deciding authority.
Commentary
Commanding ocers have an important interest in administrative
actions involving their employees. Commanding ocers typically have
more knowledge of their employees than does the agency head, including
their histories and reputations in the unit, the employees’ workplace
environment, and sometimes their personal lives. Commanding ocers
have to continue cultivating their employees and their relationships
with agency members and the public long after the cases conclude.
e insights and interests of commanding ocers could be important
considerations in the determination of nal case dispositions.
Involving commanding ocers in the decision-making process can
also be an opportunity for the agency head to mentor and develop the
leadership and management acumen of their commanding ocers, while
in the same transactions learning from managers about conditions in the
agency they might otherwise not know.
4.3 Proposed reporting relationship of the head of
Internal Aairs. e head of Internal Aairs should preferably
report directly to the agency head. If a direct reporting relationship is not
feasible, the Internal Aairs commanding ocer should nonetheless have
prompt, unrestricted, and condential access to all agency executives,
including the agency head.
Commentary
For purposes of independence, condentiality, direct and unltered
discussion, and some freedom from institutional politics and pressures,
the head of Internal Aairs should report directly to the agency head. e
role of Internal Aairs is too vital to the integrity of the agency to risk
message transmission errors, misinterpretations, or personal biases that
would interfere with the agency head’s clearest understanding of cases
and their contexts.
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Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
4.4 Standards for adjudication. Adjudicators within the agency
should use neutral and objective criteria, weigh evidence appropriately to
distinguish strong evidence from questionable or less material evidence,
and not indulge in presumptions that bias the ndings of fact. e
rationale for each adjudication should be in writing, and clearly related to
the conduct, the employee, and the agency’s rules.
Commentary
Minimum standards for adjudication of disciplinary cases include the
following:
1. e burden of proof is on the agency.
2. e standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence.
3. e standards of evidence are those of administrative law, not
criminal law.
4. No presumptions of truth are made regarding facts in dispute.
5. No presumptions are made regarding witness credibility: all persons
are equally credible unless an objective, fact-based evaluation of the
witness’s capacities, estimonial coherence, and other relevant and
demonstrable factors justify otherwise.
6. Conclusions are logically deduced from the evidence.
A thorough review of adjudicative standards would exceed the scope
of this report and would more easily be found in legal reference
works or state jury instructions on assessing evidence and testimony.
Nevertheless, an adjudication lacking in any of the six standards above
should not be considered properly justied.
In weighing evidence, facts revealing a pattern of conduct should be
considered. Where there is evidence that an employee has been accused
of the same act before in other cases involving other independent
complainants, the adjudicator may have reason to believe that the
currently alleged act is not an isolated incident. Without contrary
evidence, the greater the number of previous allegations of a
substantially similar act, the more likely than not the current case is
sustained.
Pattern of conduct evidence is evidence of specic acts, not merely
categories of allegations. For example, if an ocer has a history of
complaints for rudeness, but each complainant alleges that the ocer
used dierent language, the pattern may be too general to be valuable.
However, if in previous cases complainants alleged that the ocer used
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4.0 Mediation, Adjudication, and Disposition
a substantially similar oensive phrase or wording as used in the current
case, the pattern may be specic enough to be valuable in considering a
“sustained” nding.
Pattern of conduct evidence may come from complaints that were
sustained or not resolved. However, unfounded complaints, where it was
determined that the alleged act did not occur, are not suitable as pattern
of conduct evidence.
Pattern of conduct evidence may also come from interviews of persons
who had never been complainants. When investigating a rudeness
allegation, for example, if the investigator were to contact persons to
whom the ocer had given trac citations and found some who stated
that the ocer used the same rude phrase or wording with them, a
pattern of conduct can be established.
Sometimes pattern of conduct is a consideration in the investigative
phase depending on the model of investigation and adjudication the
agency uses.
4.5 Penalty assessment and the use of a penalty matrix.
Agencies should have some system or mechanism to ensure that
discipline is fair and consistent. A penalty matrix or similar schedule has
proven helpful to some agencies whose disciplinary systems are based
on a “progressive discipline” theory or collective bargaining agreement.
In such systems a matrix can help ensure consistency, objectivity,
and predictable penalties for misconduct. A matrix best involves
recommended ranges of discipline, allowing for the decision-maker to
consider the totality of the circumstances, including aggravating and
mitigating factors, in determining appropriate discipline.
Commentary
A matrix species the nature of oenses or policy violations and
associates them with specic penalty options or ranges of discipline.
Within such a system, a policy violation falls within a certain class or
category of violation that, in turn, corresponds to a particular range or
set of discipline options that a decision-maker can consider according to
the totality of the circumstances present in a given case.
A matrix is a helpful tool but should not be applied inexibly. e
decision-maker should consider the totality of the circumstances,
aggravating and mitigating factors, nondisciplinary outcomes, precedent,
and consistency. Precedent, in the sense of prior disciplinary decisions
for the same conduct, should be considered but should not straitjacket
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Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
the decision-maker. As times and police culture change, as the acuteness
of particular forms of misconduct may grow in the eyes of the agency
or the public, so also must disciplinary decisions change to reect
contemporary ethics and judgments about police behavior. While
discipline should be reasonably predictable, fair punishment reective of
current ethical standards should not be held hostage to what may have
been done in the past.
Broad disciplinary categories, such as Conduct Unbecoming an Ocer,
may be useful, but in order to give the greatest value to a matrix, it is
suggested that misconduct be described more precisely.
4.6 e advantages of mediation and the conditions of its
use. Voluntary mediation conducted by a neutral facilitator, in lieu of
investigation and adjudication, permits resolution of minor complaints
that are usually not easily resolved through investigation. Mediation
should be encouraged except where an ocer has a pattern of similar
misconduct or where a broader review of the employee’s performance
suggests a need to analyze the results of the investigation in the current
case. Agencies should consider enacting policies to codify all aspects of
their mediation procedures.
Commentary
Mediation engages the community by giving individual members of the
public who make a complaint the opportunity to have their concerns
heard and considered in a way that might not otherwise occur if the
complaint was investigated and adjudicated through the formal Internal
Aairs process. Mediation is best used as a means of allowing an ocer
and a citizen to better understand each other’s perspectives. Mediation
should not take place unless the complainant and the subject ocer each
voluntarily agreed to mediate.
Complaints best resolved through mediation are complaints of ocer
discourtesy or rudeness and others that involve minor “one-on-one”
interactions between ocers and members of the community. e
types of complaints that can be mediated should be described in a clear
written policy. e determination whether a given complaint is eligible
for mediation should be made according to guidelines established by the
agency, including the rank or positions authorized to permit mediation.
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4.0 Mediation, Adjudication, and Disposition
Some agencies oer an incentive to ocers who agreed to mediate. All
agencies should establish written policies to ensure that an ocer cannot
elect to mediate multiple complaints where there is the possibility of a
pattern or practice of misconduct or a motive to circumvent discipline or
otherwise bypass an agency’s early intervention system.
e decision to use internal or external facilitators may vary from agency
to agency. Outside facilitators may make community members more
comfortable that the mediation process is not biased against them or
toward the ocer, in turn making mediation a more attractive option,
as well as a more eective means of improving relations with the
community. Mediations facilitated by a member of the agency provide an
opportunity for the agency’s leaders to learn more about the conduct and
attitudes of their employees. Above all, the person chosen to mediate the
dispute must be adequately trained in dispute resolution and strive to
mediate in a neutral and objective manner.
4.7 Settlement agreements and their value. Well-reasoned
and fully justied settlement agreements, conditional suspensions
of discipline, “last-chance” agreements, and legitimate dropping of
charges or mitigation of penalties should be available when to do so will
not undermine the values of fairness, consistency, predictability, and
integrity. Decisions to modify discipline should be justied in writing.
Commentary
While it is important and ecient to settle grievances to avoid a
proliferation of appeals and reviews, it is more important that individual
ocers or their representatives not be able to manipulate the system.
Untrammeled deal making and plea bargaining can make a disciplinary
system arbitrary, unpredictable, and introduce luck into the nal
disciplinary determination. In a thorough investigation, each founded
charge against an ocer will be supported by sucient proof such that
an impartial and honest reviewer will be hard-pressed to overturn a
disciplinary decision.
ere is a place nonetheless for settlement and last-chance agreements
and mitigation in appropriate circumstances. Some agencies hold
penalties in full or partial abeyance and do not make the ocer serve
the actual numbers of days o if the ocer’s conduct in the next year
is free of similar misconduct. Wisely deployed, these devices can be a
useful and progressive way to encourage good behavior. Used unwisely,
habitual suspension of sentences can encourage excessive deal making
and introduce arbitrariness into the disciplinary system.
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Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
4.8 Exploring alternatives to traditional discipline.
Creative alternatives to traditional punitive discipline may be useful in
improving the performance of wayward employees in ways traditional
punitive discipline is not. is is an area typically unexplored in larger
agencies until recently and warrants further research and development.
Commentary
Traditional punitive discipline operates under a theory akin to criminal
justice: an oense is committed and a punishment is imposed as a
response. Typically in the interests of fairness, consistency, “progressive
discipline,” and to deter further misconduct, the punishment imposed
attempts to match the seriousness of the oense and the history of the
oender. According to this theory, a corollary benet of deterring the
misconduct of the general employee population arises as those who have
not yet committed misconduct see the punishment of those who have.
e basis for this traditional model is the presumption that punishment
either initially deters misconduct or succeeds at changing the behavior
of recipients of punishment who were not initially deterred. Law
enforcement agencies should be encouraged to explore nondisciplinary
resolutions where other and more powerful means exist to change or
modify conduct.
One alternative model is being developed
3
in which the employer’s
response to employee transgressions is not to seek a penalty to t the
oense, but to nd a strategy to t the employee.
4
One phrase used to
help inculcate this model is, “ink rst strategy, not penalty.”
According to this strategic model, in cases where core facts are not at
issue in a sustained complaint, a particular interactive process helps
determine the error in thinking that led the employee to commit the
problem act. e identication of the problem thinking provides the
leader with a starting point from which to determine what strategy
is likely to (a) reveal the errant thinking to the employee, (b) lead the
employee to come up with a solution to change the errant thinking, and
(c) enable the employee to transfer the new thinking to all situations in
which the relevant principles—not just the rules—apply. Leading the
employee to recognize the principles is a crucial feature of the system.
3
is model is being developed and implemented by Los Angeles Police Department
Deputy Chief Mark R. Perez, the commanding ocer of LAPD’s Professional Standards Bureau.
4
is applies only to nondischarge cases: employees whose acts render them unt for duty are
discharged from employment according to civil service rules. Such employees are beyond the reach
of employee development.
57
4.0 Mediation, Adjudication, and Disposition
e question of “penalty” is not important if the focus is on what is most
likely to reinforce the employee’s new understanding of the principles
and his obligations within them. A suspension or other punitive action
is not necessarily the best way to induce improved thinking and behavior
for most employees. For the strategic model, the presumption is that
behavior changes by inuencing the employee’s thinking toward acting
on explicit principles, not just rules.
Another system is being developed
5
in which alternatives to traditional
discipline are pursued that are more constructive than punitive. An
existing collective bargaining agreement already permits ocers to
surrender vacation days in lieu of being suspended. is is referred to in
the contract as “Positive Discipline.” e agency, however, is seeking to
go beyond “Positive Discipline” by creatively nding nonpunitive means
to train, remediate, or otherwise involve ocers in constructive activities
to reorient their conduct. One constructive alternative, for example, is
oering an ocer the opportunity to participate in community projects
within the jurisdiction, like doing free home repairs for persons who
could not otherwise aord the labor costs in the open market. While an
ocer could decline the oer for the alternative activity, the system is
nevertheless designed to increase the number of ways employees’ actions
can be reoriented to the agency’s standards.
Both the strategic model and the constructive alternatives model share
the following understandings:
1. e adverse eects of the traditional punishment model are
considerable:
a. Punishment forces the employee to suer loss, but does not reveal
or necessarily resolve the underlying problem motivating the
misconduct.
b. Punishment, especially in the form of unpaid suspensions, harms
more than just the employee: the employee’s family loses money,
the agency loses a deployment asset, and the jurisdiction’s citizens
lose the safety work the employee would have provided had he not
been suspended.
5
is system is being developed and implemented in the Houston Police
Department under the direction of Deputy Chief Michael Dirden.
58
Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
c. Punishment can create bitterness rather than a desire to improve.
d. Punishment can contribute to a code of silence—an unwillingness
of employees to admit to or report misconduct—if the
punishment is seen as costly.
e. e threat of punishment for misconduct can deter employees
from engaging in desirable self-initiated activities if the discipline
system is seen to punish rule violations mechanically or captiously
rather than reasonably.
f. Punishment creates a constant threat of legal and labor actions
against the employer that often takes signicant resources to
manage.
2. Properly done, alternative systems can have signicant advantages
over employee punishment:
a. e adverse eects of punishment either disappear or minimize
when punishment disappears or is minimized.
b. Alternative systems often nd the causes of the problems of the
misconduct and resolve them at their root.
c. Alternative systems tend to inspire goodwill in employees toward
their work, their employer, and their agency’s constituents
d. Alternative systems help create organizations where employees
learn their responsibilities through direct mentoring interactions
with their leaders and mutually-crafted development plans
e. Alternative systems impose and clarify a burden of responsibility
on the employee to improve, not to suer. Punitive systems
impose only the burden of suering a penalty.
f. Alternative systems make it easier to identify employees to be
discharged: an employee who, after having had the opportunity to
help reorient his thinking and actions based on an understanding
of the agency’s principles still violates those principles can no
longer be seen as merely ignorant of those principles. Misconduct,
especially a repeated violation of principles well conveyed in
earlier employee development sessions, then becomes strong
evidence of the employee’s refusal to adopt the agency’s standards.
Alternative systems clarify the employee’s intent far more clearly
than the typical incrementally increasing “progressive discipline”
of traditional punitive systems. Alternative systems can let the
employer know a lot sooner when a recalcitrant employee should
be terminated.
59
4.0 Mediation, Adjudication, and Disposition
ere are many more features and advantages to the strategic model
and the constructive alternatives model than can be explained here. e
point, however, is not to exhaustively detail the systems in this report,
but to acknowledge that there are means other than traditional punitive
discipline being seriously explored in the Internal Aairs community
of practice, and that this is an area worthy of serious research and
development.
4.9 Keeping investigations condential. Internal aairs
investigations should be closed to the ocer and the public during their
pendency. Nonetheless, the agency head should be fully informed of the
progress of internal investigations and should regularly communicate
the status of an investigation to the press and general public to the full
extent permitted by law.
Commentary
To ensure that an ocer’s rights are preserved during the course of an
Internal Aairs investigation, and to minimize interference and undue
pressure on Internal Aairs and the department at large, it is important
that investigations remain condential during their pendency. ere is
nonetheless an obligation to keep the public informed of the progress
of an investigation and such other disclosures that can be made without
compromising the investigation and to the extent allowed by law.
4.10 Guidelines for selecting and retaining Internal
Aairs investigators. To make certain that Internal Aairs units
benet from high-quality and experienced employees, agencies should
consider utilizing promotional policies that recognize service in Internal
Aairs as productive and useful for advancing an ocer’s career, and they
should make such policies explicit and well-publicized. Tours in Internal
Aairs should be limited to xed terms.
Commentary
Agencies should consider providing ocers with incentives to work in
Internal Aairs, such as an explicit policy that places service in that unit
as highly advantageous for promotional or assignment purposes.
Specic requirements should be established for the selection of
individuals to work in Internal Aairs. Prior investigative experience or a
strong investigative background should either serve as a requirement or a
signicant qualication for Internal Aairs service. Consideration should
also be given to using supervisors instead of nonsupervisors because
supervisors typically have agency-wide interests and accountability, and
60
Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
are likely to consider broader organizational questions beyond just the
question of guilt or innocence in the instant case.
Selected candidates should sign a condentiality agreement that clearly
states that it is an act of misconduct for an Internal Aairs investigator
to reveal investigative information to any person, regardless of rank,
unless that person has an authorized right and need to know, whether
that revelation is made during or after the investigator’s tour of duty in
Internal Aairs.
After being selected, the agency should provide as much ongoing
training or professional development in investigation and Internal
Aairs investigation as possible, including training in eective interview
techniques, development of case strategy, laws that apply to Internal
Aairs investigations, and other subjects relevant to fullling the
investigative mission.
Consideration should be given to limiting the tour of duty in Internal
Aairs. One agency limits its tours to 2 or 3 years, with two 1-year
extensions permitted in unusual circumstances up to a maximum of 5
years. ere are at least several reasons for limiting the tour of service.
Too long a stay in Internal Aairs may, in some cases, create investigators
who become biased. e development of such an attitude—or any other
bias—is not helpful to the employee or the investigations. In some cases,
investigators become emotionally drained or even bored after extended
stays in Internal Aairs. It is a uniquely dicult assignment and its
psychological eects are important in determining whether a tour limit
should apply and how long it might be.
e experience in Internal Aairs can be extremely valuable in the
promotion process and in giving promotees a view on employee behavior
that would not be available elsewhere. Seeing rsthand the kinds of
trouble people get into by investigating the incidents and talking with the
persons harmed by the allegations and the misconduct is a management
insight that should be oered to as many qualied people as is practical.
Also, knowing that not all allegations are true—even the most horric
ones—helps those who leave Internal Aairs respond correctly to
allegations that come before them as they advance in rank. Finally,
there is a wisdom that comes from dealing with the complexities of
investigative controversies from start to nish that can be invaluable in
helping form a mature leader. Allowing as many qualied investigators as
practical to acquire that wisdom by cycling them through Internal Aairs
can infuse the agency with a maturity in the leadership team they may
otherwise lack.
61
Appendix
Appendix: A Sampling of Major City
Police Force Discipline Policies
On May 5, 2005, e Los Angeles Police Department was awarded a
grant by the U.S. Department of Justice Oce of Community Oriented
Policing Services to convene and coordinate a National Internal Aairs
Community of Practice comprising 12 major city and county police
agencies. e Community of Practice’s goal was to develop standards and
best practices in Internal Aairs work and to share this work with the
wider law enforcement community.
e Community of Practice soon discovered that there were signicant
dierences among the participating agencies. In an eort to focus the
discussion and ensure the development of a workable set of guidelines,
Merrick Bobb, President, Police Assessment Resource Center, developed
a matrix that would provide a snapshot of each agency’s current policies
and structures in the key areas of Internal Aairs: intake, classication,
investigation, recommendation, adjudication, and discipline. Input from
other agencies not directly participating in the Community of Practice
was also sought.
We hope the matrices will provide a basic understanding of the
organization and policies of the contributing police agencies and help
guide policy development and organizational structure for the wider law
enforcement community.
62
Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
Classication
A complaint can be classied as: Maltreatment or
Unnecessary Force, Vehicle Accident, Sexual Misconduct,
Standard Operating Procedure, Property/Evidence,
Person Shot, Misc., Firearms Discharge, FTA, Criminal
Domestic, Criminal, Courtesy, Attendance.
Once classied, a complaint is assigned to: Sergeant or
Investigator
Adjudication
IA makes ndings (sustained, not sustained, etc.): (Y )
Complaints go back through the Chain of Command for
adjudication: (Y)
If Y, who makes nal disposition:
Chief of Police or His Designee
Categories of ndings: Sustained, Not Sustained,
Exonerated, Unfounded, Exceptionally Closed
Investigation
At what command level is each type of complaint
investigated: e Oce of Professional Standards
Investigates Priority I Complaints; Employee’s
Supervisor Investigates Priority II Complaints
Investigation is supervised/reviewed by:
In OPS Lieutenant
Priority II Employee’s Supervisor
Discipline
IA recommends discipline: (N)
If Y, who makes recommendation:
e recommendation is made to:
Chief of Police or His Designee
Discipline is ultimately imposed by:
Chief of Police or His Designee
Intake
Manner in which complaints can be received: Any Source
Anonymous complaints accepted: (Y)
ird-party complaints accepted: (Y)
Penalty of perjury for false statements: (Y Ocers)
Dispose of complaint prior to classication: (Y)
If Y, how? Supervisor on-scene, but if complainant
insists complaint must be taken.
Complaint forms numbered and tracked: (Y )
Complaint is forwarded for classication to: Oce of
Professional Standards
IA is under what division/oce: e Oce of the Chief
IA is headed by: Lieutenant
Head of IA reports to: Major
Rank of IA investigators: Investigators and Sergeants
Number of IA investigators: 24
Total number of sworn employees: 1,786
Recommendation
IA recommends ndings (sustained, not sustained, etc.): (Y)
If Y, who makes recommendation:
IA Commander- Lieutenant
e recommendation is made to:
OPS Commander - Major
If Y, who reviews recommendation:
If Sustained, E’s Chain of command;
If Not Sustained, No further Review
Internal Aairs Matrix—Atlanta Police Department
63
Appendix
Classication
A complaint can be classied as: Violation of Rules/
Procedures-with the allegation specifying the conduct.
Misconduct of any kind will be included in our rules.
Once classied, a complaint is assigned to:
Investig. Sgt. Det. or Lt. Det.
Adjudication
IA makes ndings (sustained, not sustained, etc.): No
Complaints go back through the Chain of Command
for adjudication: No, complaints go up chain, not down
chain.
If Y, who makes nal disposition: Up chain of command
to P.C.. P.C. makes nal disposition.
Categories of ndings: Sustained,
Not Sustained, Exonerated, Unfounded
Investigation
At what command level is each type of complaint
investigated: Sgt.Det. or Lt. Det. will investigate all
allegations of misconduct.
Investigation is supervised/reviewed by:
Lt. Det. and Deputy Superin.
Discipline
IA recommends discipline: No
If Y, who makes recommendation: Bureau Chief, Assist
Bureau Chief, Legal advisor jointly recommend to P.
Commissioner.
e recommendation is made to: PC
Discipline is ultimately imposed by: PC
Intake
Manner in which complaints can be received:
Any method of complaint is processed
Anonymous complaints accepted: yes
ird-party complaints accepted: yes
Penalty of perjury for false statements: no
Dispose of complaint prior to classication: yes
When the allegation of misconduct does not describe
a violation of our rules, the receiving superior ocer
will document it and forward to C.O. then to IAD
Commander.
IA is under what division/oce: Bureau of Internal Investigation
IA is headed by: Deputy Superintendent
Head of IA reports to: Superintendent Bureau Internal Investigations
Rank of IA investigators: Sgt. Det. and Lt. Det.
Number of IA investigators: Twelve: Nine Sg. Dets. report to three Lt. Dets. – three teams
Total number of sworn employees: 2,050
Recommendation
IA recommends ndings (sustained, not sustained, etc.): yes
If Y, who makes recommendation: Investigator, IAD
Commander, Bureau Chief, and Legal Advisor reviews
e recommendation is made to: Up chain of command
to P. Commissioner
Recommendations reviewed at each level
If Y, who reviews recommendation:
Internal Aairs Matrix—Boston Police Department
64
Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
Classication
A complaint can be classied as: Variety. First
determined if use of force or other.Civilians investigate
of use of force at OPS. IAD gets all else, results in myriad
classications, 15 categories in all
Once classied, a complaint is assigned to: After force
decision, then generally facts determine where assigned.
Serious corruption, criminal, residency, medical
integrity, bias, EEO, civil suits and Lts and above always
go to IAD. Rest may go to eld or IAD
Adjudication
IA makes ndings (sustained, not sustained, etc.): (Y)
Complaints go back through the Chain of Command
for adjudication: (N) No, review only. Alternate
recommendation can be made.
If Y, who makes nal disposition: Superintendent makes
nal recommendation. ADS IAD is responsible for
identifying and evaluating input of chain
Categories of ndings: Sustained, Not Sustained,
Unfounded, Exonerated, Non-cooperation.
Investigation
At what command level is each type of complaint
investigated: Field – sergeants or rank above accused.
IAD – ocers, police agents and sergeants conduct all
investigations. OPS – civilian
Investigation is supervised/reviewed by:
Field – watch commander to exempt district commander
through at least 2 levels of chain. IAD – IAD Unit CO
(Lt) and through eld chain, at least 2 levels.
Discipline
IA recommends discipline: (Y)
If Y, who makes recommendation: Supervisor assigned
to investigator, if other than sergeant.
e recommendation is made to: Superintendent
Discipline is ultimately imposed by: Superintendent,
with review by police board of suspensions more than 6
days. Separation is sole decision of Police Board, Supt.
only recommends separation.
Intake
Manner in which complaints can be received:
In person, police facility or OPS, via phone, via letter, via
tty. web-based under development
Anonymous complaints accepted: (Y) Limited to
criminal, residency and medical abuse
ird-party complaints accepted: (Y)
Penalty of perjury for false statements: (Y) under state
law (never utilized – law is only 18 mos. old).
Dispose of complaint prior to classication: (N)
Classication occurs prior save for those complaints in
which no misconduct occurs
IA is under what division/oce: Oce of the Superintendent, direct reporting
IA is headed by: Assistant Deputy Superintendent
Head of IA reports to: Superintendent
Rank of IA investigators: Sergeant, Detective, Police Agent, Police Ocer
Number of IA investigators: 74
Total number of sworn employees: 13, 600
Recommendation
IA recommends ndings (sustained, not sustained, etc.): (Y)
If Y, who makes recommendation:
Field - Supervisor, IAD any rank.
e recommendation is made to: Superintendent (Chief)
If Y, who reviews recommendation: Each level of chain of
the accused for a minimum of two levels of review. Can
recommend alternate nding or further investigation,
cannot require. Only the Superintendent can change
nding.
Internal Aairs Matrix—Chicago Police Department
65
Appendix
Classication
A complaint can be classied as: (1)IAD-Investigation
is conducted by IAD detective.(2)Division Referral-
Complaint is referred to the accused employee’s division
for a supervisor to investigate.(3)Mediation-Process
is overseen by mediation sergeant. (4)Public Integrity
Unit–Criminal allegations investigated by PIU detective.
Once classied, a complaint is assigned to:
See above explanation
Adjudication
IA makes ndings (sustained, not sustained, etc.): (Y)
Complaints go back through the Chain of Command for
adjudication: (Y)
If Y, who makes nal disposition: IAD makes nal
disposition, of course C.o.P. can overturn IAD.
Categories of ndings: Sustained, Inconclusive,
Unfounded, Exonerated, Complete
Investigation
At what command level is each type of complaint
investigated: IAD- Detectives conduct all unless very
high prole, or high-ranking ocer accused, then
conducted by sergeant. Seldom a lieutenant.
Mediation–Sergeant.
Division Referral–Sergeant.
Public Integrity Unit–Mirrors IAD.
Investigation is supervised/reviewed by:
(1) Sergeant (2) Lieutenant
(3) Deputy Chief/IAD Commander
Discipline
IA recommends discipline: (N)
If Y, who makes recommendation: Each level of
accused employee’s chain of command makes discipline
recommendation.
e recommendation is made to:
Chief of Police
Discipline is ultimately imposed by:
Chief of Police
Intake
Manner in which complaints can be received: IAD
Walk-ins, Signed fax, Internal Request for Control
Number (signed form), Station walk-ins– verbally refer
complainant to IAD w/station supervisor completing
written FYI to IAD.
Anonymous complaints accepted: (N)
ird-party complaints accepted: (N)
Penalty of perjury for false statements: (very rare)
Dispose of complaint prior to classication: (Y)
If Y, how? Mediation,
Complaint forms numbered and tracked: (Y)
Complaint is forwarded for classication to: Informal
IAD Committee
IA is under what division/oce: Administrative & Support Bureau
IA is headed by: Deputy Chief Calvin Cunigan
Head of IA reports to: Bureau Commander- Assistant Chief Tom Ward
Rank of IA investigators: Senior Corporal
Number of IA investigators: 24
Total number of sworn employees: 3,043
Recommendation
IA recommends ndings (sustained, not sustained, etc.): (Y)
If Y, who makes recommendation: Originally, the
investigating detective, with review and concurrence
through Deputy Chief if sustained. If not sustained,
reviewed with concurrence through lieutenant.
e recommendation is made to:
Chief of Police
If Y, who reviews recommendation: Ultimately C.o.P. on
sustained. IAD Lt. On others.
Internal Aairs Matrix—Dallas Police Department
66
Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
Classication
A complaint can be classied as: Criminal, Serious
Departmental Misconduct that will be investigated by
Internal Aairs or referred back to the Oce of the
Chief Investigator or the involved ocer’s command for
investigation
Once classied, a complaint is assigned to: Internal
Aairs, Involved Ocer’s Command, Oce of the Chief
Investigator (Civilian Revue)
Adjudication
IA makes ndings (sustained, not sustained, etc.): (Y)
Complaints go back through the Chain of Command for
adjudication: (Y)
If Y, who makes nal disposition: Commanding Ocer’s
Hearing, Trial Board (Dep. Chief & two Cmdrs.), Chief,
Arbitrator
Categories of ndings: Guilty, Not Guilty, Dismissed
Investigation
At what command level is each type of complaint
investigated: Criminal allegations and Serious
Departmental Misconduct-Internal Aairs
Demeanor, Procedure, Search, Service- Oce of the
Chief Investigator (Civilian Revue)
Minor Departmental Misconduct- Involved Ocer’s
Command
Investigation is supervised/reviewed by:
C.O. I.A, C.O. OCI, C.O. Inv. Ofc.’s Command
Discipline
IA recommends discipline: (Y)
If Y, who makes recommendation: C.O. Internal Aairs
e recommendation is made to: Disciplinary
Administration Unit
Discipline is ultimately imposed by: Trial Board
(Dep. Chief & two Cmdrs.), Chief, Arbitrator
Intake
Manner in which complaints can be received: In person,
telephonically, written, e-mail, anonymously,
Anonymous complaints accepted: (Y)
ird-party complaints accepted: (Y)
Penalty of perjury for false statements: (Y)
Dispose of complaint prior to classication: (Y)
If Y, how?
Conducting a preliminary investigation
Complaint forms numbered and tracked: (Y)
Complaint is forwarded for classication to:
Commanding Ocer of Internal Aairs
IA is under what division/oce: Oce of the Chief of Police
IA is headed by: Commander
Head of IA reports to: Chief of Police
Rank of IA investigators: Sergeants and Lieutenants
Number of IA investigators: Approximately 20
Total number of sworn employees: Approximately 3,700
Recommendation
IA recommends ndings (sustained, not sustained, etc.): (Y)
If Y, who makes recommendation: Ocer in Charge of
the case. Internal Aairs
e recommendation is made to: Disciplinary
Administration
If Y, who reviews recommendation: C.O. Internal Aairs
Internal Aairs Matrix—Detroit Police Department
67
Appendix
Classication
A complaint can be classied as:
Class I – Criminal Allegations
Class II – Policy Violations
Once classied, a complaint is assigned to: Class I to
Internal Aairs Division. Class II to Division Concerned.
Adjudication
IA makes ndings (sustained, not sustained, etc.): (Yes)
Complaints go back through the Chain of Command for
adjudication: (Yes)
If Y, who makes nal disposition: Chief of Police
Categories of ndings:
Sustained, Not Sustained, Unfounded, Exonerated
Investigation
At what command level is each type of complaint
investigated: Sergeants are assigned to investigate
complaints.
Investigation is supervised/reviewed by: Lieutenants.
Discipline
IA recommends discipline: (No)
If Y, who makes recommendation: Employee’s Captain
makes recommendation Reviewed by Assistant Chief
and Administrative Disciplinary Committee.
e recommendation is made to: Chief of Police
Discipline is ultimately imposed by: Chief of Police
Intake
Manner in which complaints can be received:
anonymous, in person, fax, letter, telephone.
Anonymous complaints accepted: (Yes)
ird-party complaints accepted: (Yes)
Penalty of perjury for false statements: (Yes)
Dispose of complaint prior to classication: (Yes)
If Y, how?
Modied as Duplicate, or CIO Issue.
Complaint forms numbered and tracked: (Yes)
Complaint is forwarded for classication to: Central
Intake Oce
IA is under what division/oce: Internal Investigations Command
IA is headed by: Captain of Police
Head of IA reports to: Assistant Chief, Internal Investigations Command
Rank of IA investigators: Sergeant
Number of IA investigators: 26 (Includes Reactive and Proactive investigators)
Total number of sworn employees: 4,781
Recommendation
IA recommends ndings (sustained, not sustained,
etc.): (Yes)
If Y, who makes recommendation: Lieutenant who
supervised the investigation and writes the investigative
synopsis.
e recommendation is made to:
Chief of Police
If Y, who reviews recommendation:
Captain, Assistant Chief and Chief of Police.
Internal Aairs Matrix—Houston Police Department
68
Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
Classication
A complaint can be classied as: Any one or combination
of 31 total classications (see Page 2)
Once classied, a complaint is assigned to:
1. IA – Administrative
2. IA – Criminal
3. Chain of Command
Adjudication
IA makes ndings (sustained, not sustained, etc.): (N)
Complaints go back through the Chain of Command for
adjudication: (Y)
If Y, who makes nal disposition:
Chief of Police
Categories of ndings: (see Page 3)
Investigation
At what command level is each type of complaint
investigated: Normally, Consent Decree paragraph 93
dictates where the case is assigned (see page 2), either IA
or Chain of Command. We have a “Quick Team” at IA to
handle those cases that have very minimum follow up
potential, or clearly Demonstrably False.
Investigation is supervised/reviewed by: Ocer in
Charge (LT) or Commanding Ofcr (CAPT)
Discipline
IA recommends discipline: (N)
If Y, who makes recommendation:
e recommendation is made to:
Discipline is ultimately imposed by: Chief of Police
Intake
Manner in which complaints can be received:
In person; telephonic; e-mail; TDD; verbal; written
(complaint form or any other); by any means.
Anonymous complaints accepted: (Y)
ird-party complaints accepted: (Y)
Penalty of perjury for false statements: (N)
Dispose of complaint prior to classication: (N)
If Y, how?
Complaint forms numbered and tracked: (Y)
Complaint is forwarded for classication to:
“Classications Unit” specically to classify
IA is under what division/oce: Professional Standards Bureau
IA is headed by: Commander
Head of IA reports to: Professional Standards Bureau C/O, who reports directly to Chief of Police
Rank of IA investigators: Sergeants II, and Detectives II
Number of IA investigators: 264
Total number of sworn employees: 9,734
Recommendation
IA recommends ndings (sustained, not sustained,
etc.): (N)
If Y, who makes recommendation:
e recommendation is made to:
If Y, who reviews recommendation:
Internal Aairs Matrix—Los Angeles Police Department
69
Appendix
Los Angeles Police Department
Classications (31)
Alcohol Related Unbecoming Conduct Narcotics/Drugs
Domestic Violence O-Duty Altercation Shooting Violation
Accidental Discharge Improper Remark Ethnic Remark
Discourtesy Unauthorized Force Unauthorized Tactics
Discrimination Dishonesty Insubordination
eft Neglect of Duty Sexual Misconduct
Gender Bias Unlawful Search False Imprisonment
Other Policy/Rule Failure to Appear Failure to Qualify
Preventable Trac Collision Service False Statements
Failure to Report Misconduct Misleading Statements Retaliation
Racial Proling
Consent Decree Paragraph 93
e following types of complaints shall be investigated by Internal Aairs Group:
All civil suits or claim for damages involved on-duty conduct by LAPD ocers, or o duty where
the employee’s actions are tied to the LAPD.
Unauthorized uses of force
Invidious discrimination, including improper ethnic remarks and gender bias
Unlawful search
Unlawful seizure (including false arrest and false imprisonment)
Dishonesty
Domestic Violence
Narcotics/Drugs
Sexual Misconduct
eft
Retaliation or retribution against an ocer or civilian
• All incidents where 1) a civilian is charged by an ocer with interfering with a police ocer
(Penal Code Section 148), resisting arrest, or disorderly conduct, and 2) the prosecutor’s
oce notied the Department either that it is dismissing the charge based upon ocer
credibility, or a judge dismissed the charge based upon ocer credibility.
• All incidents in which the Department has received written notication from a prosecuting
agency in a criminal case that there has been an order suppressing evidence because of any
constitutional violation involving potential misconduct by an LAPD ocer; any other judicial
nding of ocer misconduct made in the course of a judicial proceeding; or any request by
a federal or state judge or magistrate that a misconduct investigation be initiated puruant to
some information developed during a judicial proceeding before a judge or magistrate.
70
Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
(Los Angeles Police Department, continued)
• All incidents in which an ocer is arrested or charged with a crime other than low grade
misdemeanors.
• Any request by a judge or prosecutor that a misconduct investigation be initiated pursuant
to information developed during the course of an ocial proceeding in which such judge or
prosecutor has been involved.
Categories of Findings
Disciplinary: Nondisciplinary:
Unfounded Policy/Procedure
Not Resolved Employee’s Act Did Not Rise to the Level of Misconduct
Exonerated Employee’s Actions Could Have Been Dierent
Sustained – No Penalty Training
Sustained – Penalty Counseling
Admonishment Comment Card
Ocial Reprimand Notice to Correct Deciencies
Suspension Days Referral
Board of Rights Demonstrably False
Demotion Department Employee Not Involved
Resolved through Alternative Complaint Resolution
Duplicate
Withdrawn by the Chief of Police
Insucient Evidence to Adjudicate Complaint
Other Judicial Review
71
Appendix
Classication
A complaint can be classied as:
Personnel or Service; personnel complaints can contain
criminal or policy allegations. Policy allegations can be
resolved by conducting a review, or by conducting an
administrative investigation. Criminal allegations are
investigated by the Internal Criminal Investigations
Bureau (ICIB).
Once classied, a complaint is assigned to: It could be
assigned to the employee’s Unit, Internal Aairs, or ICIB.
Adjudication
IA makes ndings (sustained, not sustained, etc.): No
Complaints go back through the Chain of Command for
adjudication: Yes
If Y, who makes nal disposition: Captain and Chief for
written rep to 15 days’ suspension; Assistant Sheris
and Undersheri for 16-30 days’ suspension, demotion,
and discharge.
Categories of ndings: Founded; Unresolved;
Unfounded; Exonerated (for admin invest.)
Investigation
At what command level is each type of complaint
investigated: Reviews are conducted by sergeants or
lieutenants; unit-level administrative investigations
are conducted by lieutenants; IA investigations are
conducted by sergeants; criminal investigations are
conducted by sergeants.
Investigation is supervised/reviewed by: Lieutenant;
Captain; Commander; Chief
Discipline
IA recommends discipline: No
If Y, who makes recommendation:
e recommendation is made to:
Discipline is ultimately imposed by: Employee’s Unit
Commander; Undersheri (for discharge and demotion)
Intake
Manner in which PUBLIC complaints can be received:
Mail; e-mail; phone; in person; web site; fax;
1-800 complaint line
Anonymous complaints accepted: Yes
ird-party complaints accepted: Yes
Penalty of perjury for false statements: No
Dispose of complaint prior to classication: No
Complaint forms numbered and tracked: Yes
Complaint is forwarded for classication to:
Complaint is classied at intake
IA is under what division/oce: Leadership and Training Division
IA is headed by: Captain
Head of IA reports to: Commander
Rank of IA investigators: Sergeant
Number of IA investigators: 22 (29 budgeted)
Total number of sworn employees: 8,346 (9,385 budgeted)
Recommendation
IA recommends ndings (sustained, not sustained, etc.): No
If Y, who makes recommendation:
e recommendation is made to:
If Y, who reviews recommendation:
Internal Aairs Matrix—Los Angeles County Sheri’s Department
72
Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
Classication
A complaint can be classied as:
• Administrative misconduct
• Criminal misconduct
Once classied, a complaint is assigned to:
Either IAD intake case or out to chain of command.
Adjudication
IA makes ndings (sustained, not sustained, etc.): Y
Complaints go back through the Chain of Command for
adjudication: (Y) depending on severity.
If Y, who makes nal disposition: Either involved
member’s C/O or Dept. Disciplinary Review Ocer.
Categories of ndings: Sustained, Insu. Facts,
Exonerated, Unfounded.
Investigation
At what command level is each type of complaint
investigated:
Chain of command by members’ supervisor
IAD intake by IAD agent or lieutenant if involving senior
command ocial.
Investigation is supervised/reviewed by:
Supervised by IAD team lieutenant and reviewed by IAD
captain and director.
Discipline
IA recommends discipline: (Y)
If Y, who makes recommendation: e investigating IA
agent
e recommendation is made to: Same as adjudication
Discipline is ultimately imposed by: Either member’s
C/O or Agency DDRO.
Intake
Manner in which complaints can be received:
Anonymous complaints accepted: (Y)
ird-party complaints accepted: (Y)
Penalty of perjury for false statements: (Y)
Dispose of complaint prior to classication: (Y)
If Y, how?
Only in cases involving duplicate complaints.
Complaint forms numbered and tracked: (Y)
Complaint is forwarded for classication to: Director IAD
for triage and classication change.
IA is under what division/oce: Oce of Professional Responsibility – Assistant Chief – direct report to Chief of Police.
IA is headed by: Rank of Inspector (one grade above Captain).
Head of IA reports to: Assistant Chief of OPR.
Rank of IA investigators: Detectives and Sergeants. Sergeants have no supervisory role.
Number of IA investigators: 30 for corruption/misconduct and 20 for serious uses of force (shootings, etc.)
Total number of sworn employees: 3,800
Recommendation
IA recommends ndings (sustained, not sustained, etc.): (Y)
If Y, who makes recommendation: e investigating IAD
agent. Lt. or Capt. can “write over” if they do not concur
with ndings.
e recommendation is made to: thru director of IAD to
Assistant Chief, Oce of Prof. Responsibility.
Internal Aairs Matrix—Metropolitan Police Department (Washington, D.C.)
73
Appendix
Classication
A complaint can be classied as:
See Miami-Dade IA Matrix (2 of 2)
Once classied, a complaint is assigned to:
Investigator (Sgt.)
Adjudication
IA makes ndings (sustained, not sustained, etc.):
(Y or N)
Complaints go back through the Chain of Command for
adjudication: (Y or N)
If Y, who makes nal disposition:
Categories of ndings:
Investigation
At what command level is each type of complaint
investigated: A sergeant (rst-line supervisor)
Investigation is supervised/reviewed by: Supervised by a
Lieutenant/Reviewed by a Captain/Major
Discipline
IA recommends discipline: (Y or N)
If Y, who makes recommendation:
e recommendation is made to:
Discipline is ultimately imposed by: e Commander of
the subject employee
Intake
Manner in which complaints can be received: In person,
telephone, mail, e-mail
Anonymous complaints accepted: (Y or N)
ird-party complaints accepted: (Y or N)
Penalty of perjury for false statements: (Y or N)
Dispose of complaint prior to classication: (Y or N)
If Y, how?
Complaint forms numbered and tracked: (Y or N)
Complaint is forwarded for classication to: Investigative
sergeants
IA is under what division/oce: e Special Services Division
IA is headed by: A police major
Head of IA reports to: e Chief of the Special Services Division
Rank of IA investigators: Sergeant
Number of IA investigators: 35
Total number of sworn employees: 1,058
Recommendation
IA recommends ndings (sustained, not sustained, etc.):
(Y or N)
If Y, who makes recommendation:
e recommendation is made to:
If Y, who reviews recommendation:
Internal Aairs Matrix—Miami-Dade Police Department
74
Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
Code Type Description
1 PC Discourtesy
2 PC Harassment
3 IA Harassment/Sexual
4 IA Harassment/Sex Discrimination
5 PC Negligence
6 PC Damage to Property
7 PC Missing Property
8 PC Trac Law Violation
9 IA False Arrest
10 (Severity) Departmental Misconduct/Improper Procedure
11 PC Departmental Misconduct/Improper Investigation
12 (Severity) Departmental Misconduct/Overreacting
13 PC Departmental Misconduct/Misinformation
14 PC Departmental Misconduct/Misrepresentation
15 PC Departmental Misconduct/Abuse of Authority
16 PC Departmental Misconduct/Unnecessary Towing
17 (Severity) Departmental Misconduct/Improper Search
18 IA Criminal Misconduct/Misdemeanor
19 IA Criminal Misconduct/Felony
20 IA Criminal Misconduct/Battery
21 IA Criminal Misconduct/eft
22 IA Criminal Misconduct/Narcotics
23 IA Criminal Misconduct/Substance Abuse
24 IA Criminal Misconduct/Bribery
25 (PC) Minor Force/No Visible Injury (Mere Touching)
26 IA Minor Force/Injury (During Arrest)
27 IA Unauthorized Force/No Visible Injury (During Arrest)
28 IA Unauthorized Force/Injury (During Arrest)
29 IA Departmental Misconduct/Force Violation
30 (Severity) Miscellaneous
31 IA Death in Custody
32 IA Discrimination
33 IA Departmental Misconduct/Improper Arrest
34 IA Departmental Misconduct/Conduct Unbecoming Violation
35 IA Departmental Misconduct/Property Violation
36 IA Departmental Misconduct/Substance Violation
37 IA Departmental Misconduct/Force Violation-Domestic
38 IA Departmental Misconduct/Battery-Domestic
39 IA Domestic Related (Used with Other Allegation)
40 SI Shooting/Contact
41 SI Shooting/Non-Contact
42 SI Shooting/Animal
43 SI Shooting/Accidental
44 (Severity) Enforcement Proling
Miami-Dade Police Department
Classication/Allegation Codes
75
Appendix
Classication
A complaint can be classied as: Physical abuse, verbal
abuse, harassment, lack of service, false arrest, other
misconduct, criminal allegation
Once classied, a complaint is assigned to:
IAD investigator or District/Unit Commanding Ocer
Adjudication
IA makes ndings (sustained, not sustained, etc.): (Yes)
Complaints go back through the Chain of Command for
adjudication: (Yes)
If Y, who makes nal disposition: Police Commissioner
Categories of ndings: Sustained, not sustained,
unfounded, exonerated, closed without nding due to
lack of cooperation, department violations.
Investigation
At what command level is each type of complaint
investigated: IAD investigator or District Unit
Commander
Investigation is supervised/reviewed by: IAD Squad
Captain/ Commanding Ocer IAD (Inspector)
Discipline
IA recommends discipline: (No)
If Y, who makes recommendation:
e recommendation is made to:
Discipline is ultimately imposed by:
Intake
Manner in which complaints can be received:
In person, at district/Unit, mail, letter, Police Advisory
Commission, Mayor’s Action Center
Anonymous complaints accepted: (yes
ird-party complaints accepted: (Yes)
Penalty of perjury for false statements: (No)
Dispose of complaint prior to classication: (No)
If Y, how?
Complaint forms numbered and tracked: (Yes)
Complaint is forwarded for classication to:
Commanding Ocer, Internal Aairs Division
(Inspector)
IA is under what division/oce: Internal Aairs report directly to the Police Commissioner
IA is headed by: Deputy Commissioner Richard Ross
Head of IA reports to: Police Commissioner
Rank of IA investigators: Lieutenant and Sergeant
Number of IA investigators: 50 line squad investigators
Total number of sworn employees: 6,679
Recommendation
IA recommends ndings (sustained, not sustained,
etc.): N/A
If Y, who makes recommendation:
e recommendation is made to:
If Y, who reviews recommendation:
Internal Aairs Matrix—Philadelphia Police Department
76
Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
Classication
A complaint can be classied as: Criminal or
Administrative
Once classied, a complaint is assigned to: Investigator
Adjudication
IA makes ndings (sustained, not sustained, etc.): (Y )
Complaints go back through the Chain of Command for
adjudication: (Y) Employee reviews draft for input before
investigation is nalized.
If Y, who makes nal disposition: Commander
Categories of ndings: Sustained, Unfounded,
Exonerated, Unresolved, Policy Failure, Training Issue
Investigation
At what command level is each type of complaint
investigated: For non-supervisory involved, a detective
or sergeant/rst line supervisor will investigate. If
the subject employee is a supervisor, a sergeant or
Lieutenant will be primary. If the subject employee is
Command or Exec level, the PSB Commander will attend
the interview, but the investigation will be completed by
a Lieutenant.
Investigation is supervised/reviewed by: Lieutenant,
Commander, and Assistant Chief
Discipline
IA recommends discipline: (Y or N)
If Y, who makes recommendation: N/A
e recommendation is made to: Discipline is based on
a discipline matrix solution. For suspensions or greater,
a disciplinary review board makes recommendation to
Police Chief.
Discipline is ultimately imposed by: Employee’s
supervisor, Bureau Commander/Administrator, Police
Chief
Intake
Manner in which complaints can be received: In person,
letter, telephone, and e-mail.
Anonymous complaints accepted: (Y)
ird-party complaints accepted: (Y)
Penalty of perjury for false statements: (N)
Dispose of complaint prior to classication: (N)
If Y, how?
Complaint forms numbered and tracked: (Y)
Complaint is forwarded for classication to: Investigator
IA is under what division/oce: Professional Standards Division
IA is headed by: 2 Police Commanders: Cmdr 1- Investigations, Inspections, Mayoral Security: Cmdr 2- Supv Invest., Invest., and Admin.
Head of IA reports to: Assistant Police Chief
Rank of IA investigators: Detective, Sergeant, and Lieutenant
Number of IA investigators: 22
Total number of sworn employees: 3,067
Recommendation
IA recommends ndings (sustained, not sustained,
etc.): (Y)
If Y, who makes recommendation: Investigator
e recommendation is made to: Investigations
Lieutenant
If Y, who reviews recommendation: PSB Commander
Internal Aairs Matrix—Phoenix Police Department
U. S. Department of Justice
Oce of Community Oriented Policing Services
1100 Vermont Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20530
To obtain details about COPS Oce programs, call the
COPS Oce Response Center at 800.421.6770
Visit COPS Online at www.cops.usdoj.gov
e060930210
Standards and Guidelines for Internal Aairs: Recommendations from a
Community of Practice
rough a grant from the Oce of Community Oriented Policing
Services, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) convened the
National Internal Aairs Community of Practice group comprising the
LAPD and 11 major city and county law enforcement agencies. e
purpose was to share and develop standards, recommendations, and best
practices in Internal Aairs work, discuss dierences and similarities
in practice, and look at various approaches to improving individual and
collective agencies’ Internal Aairs practices. is report is the result of
the group’s work.
e project rearmed the vital importance of Internal Aairs as a
critical internal police agency function. Internal Aairs serves two
communities—law enforcement and the general public—and is essential
in building and maintaining mutual trust and respect between the two.
